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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXVI.
things to be abandoned as they appear in consciousness, or even thi lost character were not distinguished, or even when they appeared in consciousness, if there came about no ordinary Cognition envisaging them, then, under these contingencies, there might be room for asserting what has been asserted. As a matter of fact, however, when the entire world appears in consciousness, even the thing to be acquired and to be abandoned appear in consciousness without any incongruity, and without losing any of their essential character; and subsequently, it all becomes apprehended by the pure ordinary Cognition brought about by the force of the Cognition of the Omniscient Person. Why then, can there be no Cognition of things as distinguished from one another?
Thus it has been proved that there is no room for the objection as against the view that Cognitions are formless.
If then, the objection is meant to be urged against the view that Cognitions have forms,-then, also there is no such incompatibility as has been urged. Because as the limit-less things, manifesting themselves in endless forms, come into existence, --so also does the Consciousness of the Omniscient Person, which appears as envisaging the forms of all those limitless things; and there is no incongruity in this; as there is nothing incompatible in a single Cognition envisaging the forms of several things.
"Certainly, if what is one envisages many forms,-there is incongruity".
Not so; because the forms are unreal. If the one thing had several real forms, then there would be incompatibility between the one and the many. As a matter of fact, however, the view that is held is that the many forms do not really belong to the one thing.
"If that is so, then the Cognition of the Omniscient Person would be associated with a wrong Cognition; and thereby the Omniscient Person would be mistaken".
Not so; as He would cognise things as they are, there would be nothing wrong in it. He would be 'mistaken' if He had cognised as real what is really unreal. When, however, He cognises the unreal forms as unreal,then, how can He be said to be mistaken'
“When all things are embraced within a single Cognition, and yet He treats them differently, as seen' and the rest; how then can He be regarded as not mistaken ?"
There is no force in this; because, He is cognisant of the right means, Ho could be mistaken, if he neglected the right means of apprehending the thing, and apprehended it by some other secondary means. In fact however, according to the view that Cognitions have forms, there is no means of apprehending & thing except the apprehension of the form of its Cognition; how then could the Person be mistaken if He apprehended the thing by the right and proper means?
Thus then, just as in the case of the knowable things, so in the case of the Cognition also, there is apprehension of the forms of limitless things, and on that account it is said that 'limitless things are embraced by it.
When things enter into the Cognition in certain forms, in those same forms they become recognised by the representative consciousness that
