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EXAMINATION OF THE 'PERSON OF SUPER-NORMAL VISION'. 1571
existing.--Nor has the endlessness of things been accepted on the ground of their not being comprehended under Cognition; by virtue of which, if they became apprehended, they would come to have limits. All that has been held is that the extension of space being limitloss, the Region containing' the things is 'limitless', 'endless'; as the Region of puro 'Existence is endloss', also because there can be no limits to the enumeration (of things). Nor is there any incompatibility between 'being apprehended and the absence of limits' for the filling up of space; -on account of which 'incompatibility', things would have to be regarded as 'not apprehended'.-If it is asked"If He does not comprehend all things within His Cognition, how can He be omniscient?",--the answer is that, it would be so, for that very reason; that is, it is just because He does not apprehend things as limited that He becomes omniscient; otherwise, if He had apprehended the limitless things as limited, He would be clearly mistaken. Because one is called "omniscient' only when He apprehends existing things as existent, and non-excisting things as non-existent;--and to the Region of existence, there is no limit at all. Hence if one apprehends as non-existent, the limit, which does not exist in the form of movement,--and if he apprehends as existent, the Limit, which does exist in the form of being cognised by the Omniscient Person, --why should He be regarded as 'Not-Omniscient'?
The following might be urged-"Under the view that Cognition is formless, there can be no apprehension of objects; because such Cognition would be indistinguishable. Consequently, no differentiation of particular things and functions being possible,-this view of Cognition being formless should not be put forward at all; as it would be always open to objection".
This is not right. In regard to the Cognition of the Omniscient Person, no differentiation of things and their functions is admitted; because the said Cognition envisages all things: because the idea is that the said Cognition (of the Omniscient Person) envisages, not the Blue only, nor the yellow only, but all things. In the case of men with limited powers of vision, their Cognition envisages only particular things; hence as in his case, under the view that 'Cognitions are formless',--all things would stand on the same footing, the impossibility of well-known distinctions is declared to be open to objection. Because, as there could be no such distinction as 'this is the Cognition of Blue', 'that is the Cognition of Yellow '-even common people would be equally omniscient; this is what is urged against this view; as regards the Omniscient Person himself, such non-distinction would be only right; hence how could the said contingency be urged as an undesirable one ?-Thus in the state of Omniscience, it is only right and proper that the Cognition should be formless and brought about by the powers of mysticism.
It might be argued that-"In that case things could not be distinguished as (1) those to be acquired, and (2) those to be abandoned".
Not so, we reply. If in the event of the limitless number of things appearing in consciousness at one and the same time, there were incom. patibility with the things being cognised as (1) to be acquired and (2) to be abandoned,--and if there were no such incompatibility with other things, and there were some loss of character on the part of the things to be acquired and
