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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXVI.
are endless. Because when all things would be embraced within the orbit of & single cognition,-how could they be saved from the contingency of not being endless ?--This has been asserted thus-Being embraced within a single cognition, there is nothing outside that limit; and thus the idea being that things are only so many, they cannot be endless, they become limited'. -Under the circumstances, the idea of the simultaneous cognition of all things would be open to the same objection that has been urged against the ides of their successive cognition.
There is no force, however, in this argument. If this argument is put up on the basis of the opinion that Cognitions are formless, then it is all irrolevant. Because, whenever a thing, on becoming cognised, thereby acquires existence,--all that is comprehended by the cognition of the Omniscient Person is that it is existent, and is, therefore, said to be embraced by it; and it is not meant by this that it covers the place occupied by the thing, in the way that the cloth covers a number of jars. The mere fact that certain things are apprehended by a single cognition does not deprive the things of their own nature or character: whereby, by reason of being apprehended by a single cognition, they would renounce their endless character. When various things, like the Blue, the Yellow and so forth, appearing in a single picture, become apprehended by a single cognition, - they do not cease to be many; nor do they become merged into one another; in fact, they are apprehended by the cognition exactly as they are, -not in any other form. In the same manner, the World which has scistence is apprehended by the cognition of the Omniscient Person exactly as it exists.-- As a matter of fact, there is no end to the extent of the worldly region in any direction; hence it is apprehended as limitless,-not as limited. How then could it be regarded as having an end ?
It might be urged that "If the apprehension of the entire world is admitted, then, how could there be no apprehension of the limits?"
It is not so, we reply. Where is there any such universal Proposition that 'wherever there is apprehension of the entirety of things, there must be apprehension of the limits also'? As a matter of fact, of all the things that exist, there is not one which has existence and has its form unapprehended by the cognition of the Omniscient Person; in fact all things appear and disappear only as having their forms apprehended by the consciousness of the Omniscient Person; not a single thing is left out. This is what is meant by His apprehending 'all things in their entirety'. This also is what is meant by all things being embraced in a single cognition'; other. wise, the fact of all things being spoken of as'all' may also be not admitted, - in order to avoid their having limits. So there is nothing in this.
It has been argued that-"on account of the things being all included under a single cognition, there would follow the corollary that there is nothing apart from all these; how then would it be denied that the said things have their limit?"
This also is not right. Under the view of people who regard Cognition as formless, there can be no actual 'inclusion of things within the Cognition; all that happens is that they become indicated by the Cognition merely as
