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EXAMINATION OF THE PERSON OF SUPER-NORMAL VISION'. 1545
Further, the knowledge of these people relating to the eternal Soul that is spoken of-does this knowledge or Cognition proceed from the person's own Soul or not? These are the only two alternatives possible. In the former case, all his Cognitions should appear simultaneously, as their efficient cause would be there. In the latter case, is the Cognition eternal or noteternal ? In both cases, that Soul would only be a replica of his own Soul, and hence, like the Cognition of other people, it could not envisage that Soul.—(3541-3543)
It has been argued under Text 3207, that-"His knowledge consists in the direct perception of His pure Self, and when the source of that knowledge is not pure, the knowledge itself is called Ignorance".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXTS (3544-3546).
HIS KNOWLEDGE DOES not CONSIST IN THE DIRECT PERCEPTION OF HIS
PURE SELF; BECAUSE THAT IS DEVOID OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 'COGNISABLE', AS HAS BEEN PROVED IN DETAIL.-IF THE SOUL (SELF) IS HELD TO BE OF THE NATURE OF COGNITION (CONSCIOUSNESS),
THERE CAN BE NO APPREHENSION OF IT AS SUCH ; BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE 'SEEN' AND THE 'SEEING'.-IF THEN THE SAID COGNITION IS HELD TO BE SELF-ILLUMINED, THEN IT COMES TO BE 'SELF-COGNITION, AND AS SUCH IT WOULD MEAN THAT THE COGNITION IS AMENABLE TO DIRECT PERCEPTION.—(3544–3546)
COMMENTARY.
If the Soul is held to be unconscious in its essence, then the Cognition that apprehends it must be regarded as impure; as it has been proved under the chapter on the 'External World' that by their very nature, all Cognitions are devoid of the apprehended and the apprehender.
If, on the other hand, the Soul is held to be of the nature of Consciousness itself, then there would be non-difference between what is seen (cognised, i.e. the soul) and the seeing (Cognition, Consciousness); so that they could not be related to each other as the apprehended and the apprehender; which would mean that the Cognition could not be regarded as apprehending the Soul. Because it is only when there is some difference between the subject and the object that they can bear to each other the relation of the apprehender and the apprehended.
If, lastly, the idea is that, being luminous, like the lamp, the Cognition apprehends and envisages itself, then there would be 'self-Cognition', which you do not admit; and it would set aside your idea that Cognition cannot be perceived. This is what is shown by the words-'It would mean that Cognition is amenable to direct Perception'.-(3544-3546)
