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1562
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXVI.
TEXT (3597). "THERE BEING NO CONCEPTUAL CONTENT IN HIS CASE, HOW COULD THERE BE ANY DESIRE IN HIM to speak? INASMUCH AS HE HAS RENOUNCED ALL ACTIVITY, THERE CAN BE NO CONCEPTUAL
CONTENT FOR HIM."-(3597)
COMMENTARY.
There can be no 'desire to speak' on the part of a person in whom no Conceptual Content is possible; because the said desire is only a form of Conceptual Content. The Desire thus being invariably concomitant with
Conceptual Content', how could it exist in the absence of this latter ? Certainly when the 'tree' is absent, the 'Shimshapa' cannot be there. For the Omniscient Person, any Conceptual Content is impossible; because all obstacles in the shape of the Afflictions, etc. have disappeared, and Conceptual Content is, by its nature, wrong, mistaken. Consequently if He had the Conceptual Content, the Omniscient Person would have to be regarded as 'mistaken':-(3597)
The Author answers this objection in the following
TEXT (3598)."
IT CANNOT BE SO; BECAUSE, AS REGARDS THE CONCEPTION THAT IS BESET WITH AFFLICTIONS, NO SUCH IS POSSIBLE IN HIS CASE, AS ALL'OBSCURATION HAS DISAPPEARED FROM HIM. WHILE THAT CONCEPTION WHICH IS FAVOURABLE TO THE WORLD'S WELFARE AND HENCE HEALTHY', -WHO WOULD
PREVENT THAT ?-(3598)
OOMMENTARY.
Conceptual Content is of two kinds-(1) that which is favourable to troubles, and hence 'beset with Afflictions', and (2) that which is favourable
to the appearance of 'freedom from greed' and such qualities, and hence "Healthy'.-Of these that which is 'beset with Afflictions' can never be present in persons who have got rid of all obscurations in the shape of the Afflictions,-because the cause of this is not present there; while that which is 'Healthy', that is not incompatible with the man who has got rid of the obscurations; hence if this 'healthy' Conceptual Content does appear, through the mercy of the Blessed Lord, -as it would be favourable to the welfare of the world and hence 'healthy', why should any one object to its appearance ? --(3598)
The following might be urged-“As a matter of fact, all Conceptual Content, by its nature, appears in the form of the conception of a thing
