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EXAMINATION OF THE PERSON OF SUPER-NORMAL VISION'. 1551
TEXTS (3562-3564).
EVEN IN THE PERSON WERE STANDING BEFORE YOU, HOW COULD YOU
HAVE THE CERTAINTY THAT SHE IS NOT OMNISCIENT'? IF YOU HAD THIS KNOWLEDGE, YOU WOULD BE COGNISANT OF THINGS BEYOND THE SENSES IF YOU DEDUCE THE FACT OF ALL PERSONS BEING NOT-OMNISCIENT FROM SEEING THAT YOU YOURSELF ARE NOT SO,THEN, THERE WOULD BE THIS INCONGRUITY THAT (YOUR) BRAHMĀ AND OTHER DEITIES WOULD DEDUCE THE omniscience OF ALL PERSONS FROM THEIR OWN OMNISCIENCE. IF IT BE URGED THAT THERE IS CONVICTION REGARDING THE PRESENCE OF SUCH QUALITIES IN ALL MEN ONLY WHEN WE DO NOT PERCEIVE ANYTHING TO THE CONTRARY", THEN OUR ANSWER IS THAT IN REGARD TO THE MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION, THE MERE SUSPICION TO THE CONTRARY HAS THE SAME EFFECT AS THE ACTUAL PERCEPTION OF THAT CONTRARY,-(35623564)
COMMENTARY.
That is, even when the man is standing before one, one sees only his body, and if the observer is himself not-omniscient, he cannot know that the man before him is not-omniscient.
Bhäve'- i.e. if there were the certainty that the man is not-omniscient.
If, in order to save the Reason from being 'Inadmissible', the conviction regarding all men being not-omniscient be taken as deduced from one's own non-omniscience;-then there would be incongruities and the Reason would become 'Inconclusive':--This is what is pointed out by the words-'If you deduce, etc. etc. The compound 'ātmāsarvajñatādratau' is to be expounded as dretau-from the perception-asarvajñatāyāh-of non-omniscience'atmani', -in yourself.
The following might be urged-"In the case of the proving of the presence of a certain quality in all men, the idea is rendered impossible by the perception of the diversity of wisdom, eto, among men; hence no attempt is made to prove it; in the case of non-omniscience, however, the idea is not rendered impossible by anything; hence there could be no such incongruity as has been indicated".
This is not right. Just as a Reason cannot prove that of which the contrary has been perceived, similarly it cannot also prove that of which the contrary is suspected; and in this respect, the suspicion of the contrary does not differ from the perception of the contrary. Consequently, there can be no proving of non-omniscience, because its contrary is open to suspicion.(3562-3564)
It has been argued, under Text 3217, that the teaching of Buddha and others is capable of another explanation also, etc. etc.".
The answer to this is as follows:
