________________
EXAMINATION OF THE PERSON OF SUPER-NORMAL VISION'. 1495
either the Reason or the subject of our reasoning is not in accordance with our own doctrine, but in accordance with the popular notion of things. Consequently there can be no 'Inadmissibility in the Reason adduced by us".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXTS (3369-3370).
THE SPEAKERSHIP THAT IS POPULARLY CONCEIVED BY MEN, --IF THAT IS PUT FORWARD AS THE REASON, THEN IT WOULD BE OPEN TO THE CHARGE OF HAVING ITS PRESENCE IN THE CONTRARY OF THE
PROBANDUM POSSIBLE.-(3369-3370)
COMMENTARY.
Here also, its exclusion from the contrary of the Probandum being doubtful, the Reason becomes Inconclusive':-(3369-3370)
The following Text clarifies that 'Inadmissibility' which the opponent has urged against the doctrine of the Idealist :
TEXT (3370).
“WHEN THE DOCTRINE IN QUESTION HAS NO REASON IN ITS SUPPORT, -WHAT SORT OF INADMISSIBILITY' WOULD THERE
BE IN REGARD TO IT?"-(3370)
COMMENTARY.
The opponent argues as follows "Only those arguments in support of, or against, anything, are admissible which set forth ideas accepted with certainty of conviction by both parties,-not what is not accepted by either party, or what is doubtful; because arguments of the latter sort would need further arguments in support of them. When, thus, the doctrine of the Idealist is one that is not vouched for by any Means of Right Cognition, how can Inadmissibility be urged (against any Reason urged against it)? A conclusion does not become vitiated by the arbitrary assumption of admissibility or inadmissibility; it is effective only when these are vouched for by proofs; and as a matter of fact the doctrine of Idealism has not been
