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EXAMINATION OF THE 'PERSON OF SUPER-NORMAL VISION'. 1491
a speaker' is certainly incompatible with it; because Omniscience cannot co-exist along with Speakership’, of which Conceptual Content' is the indirect Cause; because on the principle that one cannot utter words without previous cogitation and thinking', Conceptual Content is the cause of Speaking; and as all Conceptual Content is associated with verbal expression, it cannot apprehend the forms of things, this latter being amenable to only such cognition as is free from Conceptual Content; thus during the conceptual stage, there being no apprehension of the form of things, there can be no Omniscience. Thus Omniscience being contrary to (incompatible with) Speakership, the presence of one would mean the absence of the other, due to the non-apprehension of its Cause. So that our Reason is not 'Inconclusive '.-This Reason, Speakership' is implied by the term 'ādi' in the sentence 'one who has the characters of being knowable, cognisable, etc. etc.' (under Text 3157)."
This is the view anticipated in Texts 3359-3360, and answered in Texts 3361-3362, as follows:
TEXTS (3359-3362).
IN THIS MATTER, THE SPEAKERSHIP OF THE LORD BEING IMPLIED BY
THE FIRST WORD UTTERED BY HIM, A CERTAIN PARTY THINKS THAT THERE IS AN INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN SUCH "SPEAKERSHIP AND OMNISCIENCE', AND HENCE CONCLUDES THAT THERE CAN BE NO OMNISCIENCE'; BECAUSE THERE CAN BE SPEAKERSHIP ONLY WHEN THERE IS CONCEPTUAL CONTENT', WHILE ONE COULD BE
OMNISCIENT' ONLY IF THERE WERE NO CONCEPTUAL CONTENT '; AS A MATTER OF FACT, (HE URGES) AN ENTITY IS NEVER APPREHENDED BY A COGNITION ASSOCIATED WITH VERBAL EXPRESSION AS REGARDS THIS REASONING ALSO, THOSE WHO THINK THAT THE
SPEAKERSHIP OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON FOLLOWS FROM COGITATION AND THINKING, DO NOT ADMIT THE OMNISCIENT PERSON ON THE GROUND OF HIS BEING A SPEAKER '; NOR ON THE GROUND OF HIS CONCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE; IN CASE, HOWEVER, THERE IS NO * CONCEPTUAL CONTENT ', THERE CAN BE NO SPEAKERSHIP',(3359-3362)
COMMENTARY.
Some people hold that the "Speakership of the Lord is due to the appearance of the Conceptual Content'; while others are of the opinion that, on account of previous impetus, the Lord proceeds to speak even without any conceptual idea.
Under the former view, if what is meant to be proved is that there can be no Omniscience during the conceptual state', then the argument is superfluous; because these people themselves admit that in the conceptual state, the Lord is not omniscient.--If, on the other hand, what is meant to be
