________________
EXAMINATION OF THE PERSON OF SUPER-NORMAL VISION'. 1489
TEXTS (3354-3355). As A MATTER OF FACT, THERE IS NO INCOMPATIBILITY, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, BETWEEN THE CHARACTER OF KNOWING ALL THINGS' AND THAT OF BEING COGNISABLE, ETC.'-IN FACT COGNISABILITY' IS PROVED BY THE 'ABSENCE OF INCOGNISABILITY', NOT BY THE ABSENCE OF OMNISCIENCE'; THIS LATTER THEREFORE RETAINS ITS CHARACTER.-(3354-3355)
COMMENTARY. When one desires to establish the denial of one thing by the affirmation of another, he should affirm that which may be incompatible either directly or indirectly, with what is to be denied, -and not that which is not so in. compatible. If it were not so, then the affirmation of anything at random might lead to the denial of all things. In the case in question, there is no incompatibility, direct or indirect, between 'Omniscience' and 'cognisability": For instance, incompatibility between any two things can be of only two kinds—(1) in the form of mutual exclusion, the presence and absence of one implying the absence and presence, respectively, of the other,-e.g. between Existence and Non-existence, or between Succession and Non-succession; and (2) in the form of impossibility of co-existence; e.g. between Fire and Cool. ness.--That the former kind of incompatibility is not there between
Omniscience' and 'cognisability' is shown by the words-Cognisability is proved, etc. etc.'-It has been pointed out on a previous occasion that there is 'incompatibility of the kind of mutual exclusiveness between those two things only of which the cognition of one means the non-cognition of the other; and cognisability' is there, as excluding, not 'Omniscience, but 'incognisability':-(3354-3355)
The following Text shows that the second kind of incompatibility also is not there in the case in question --
TEXT (3356). OMNISCIENCE HAS NEVER BEFORE BEEN SEEN TO APPEAR ON THE APPEARANCE OF ITS COMPLETE CAUSE,-BY VIRTUE OF WHICH
IT COULD BE SAID TO CEASE ON THE APPEARANCE OF THE CHARACTER OF BEING AN ENTITY'
AND SO FORTH.-(3356)
COMMENTARY. It is only when between two things, one does not appear even when its Cause is present in its perfect condition,-by reason of the presence of the other,-that the two are said to be incompatible', in the sense of never co-existing ;-as regards the case in question, Omniscience has never before been seen to appear on the appearance of its Cause in perfect condition, by virtue of which it could cease on the appearance of the character of being an entity' (3356)
