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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXVI.
Because the host of Defects like Love, Hatred and the like have their cause in the reverses experienced by one's own self and also by people related to himself; as they always appear in accordance with the positive and negative concomitance of these latter.
Nor can the Defects be regarded as inherent in all living beings; because those living beings themselves are not admitted ; in fact there is no object in the shape of the living being', whose properties these Defects-Love, etc.
could be. It is only something set up by Conception as something spoken of as 'this', as the wholo idea of quality and qualified is purely conceptual (ianciful).-If it be held that the Defects are to be regarded as the properties of living beings, because they are subjective in character or because they are produced in the mind, then also there is 'inadmissibility' and 'inconclusiveness. For instance, if the other party wishes to regard the Defects as objects and the Mind as the subject, then he has to admit that the Mind is of the nature of the apprehension of things; 88 otherwise the Mind and the Thing could not be related as object and subject. And when the Mind is admitted to be of the nature of the apprehension of things, it will have to be asserted that it is apprehended by a part of that same nature of itself; how else could it be apprehended? If it were apprehended by a form that did not exist, then there could not be the relation of object and subject. For instance, the Object does not exist in the form in which it is envisaged by the Cognition; and the Thing is not envisaged by the Cognition in the form in which it exists; so Cognitions would become objectless, and this would lead to the absurdity of all things being unknown. From all this it follows that the character of apprehending things in their well-known forms constitutes its very nature, and it has been explained that the well-known form of things consists in being momentary, soul-less and so forth. Thus Cognition is of the nature of the apprehension of soul-lessness, not of the nature of the apprehension of the Soul.
As regards any other charactor of it, that can be postulated only by deluded people, and can proceed only from some adventitious circumstances ; and not because that is its very nature; in fact it is like the notion of serpent' in regard to the Rope. It is for this reason that the host of Afflictions, even in their most blatant forms, are unable to shake the strength of the doctrine of No-soul'. Because being due to adventitious causes, the Afflictions are never very firm. As regards the idea of No-soul', on the other hand, it forms the very nature of things and is also helped by Means of Cognition; hence it is strong and firm. Hence even though the hostility rests equally in both, yet it is the idea of the Soul' on which its contrary fastens itself,-not so the idea of the Soul' upon the other, because it is contrary to that.
Even for the man who holds the view that the external world does not exist, Cognition is of the nature of the apprehension of 'No-soul', not of the nature of the apprehension of the Soul'; because this Soul does not exist. For instance, if, on the ground of the object (No-soul) not being existent, the Cognition be not regarded as of the nature of the apprehension of that, then it must be admitted that the Cognition is of the nature of its own apprehension. Otherwise there would be no fixity regarding the Cogni. tion either. The Soul too can be cognised only in the form of No-soul'.
