________________
1480
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXVI.
things cannot be set aside without special effort and no effort of intelligent men is possible towards the rejecting or acquiring of anything until the good and bad points of the things to be acquired and rejected have been duly perceived. And until the man has become very much upset, he cannot perceive good points in Defects and bad points in their contrary; for the simple reason that he has not been upset. People whose minds have not become perverted do not acquire things free from Deiecta as defective; they do not acquire the defective thing as gold. The idea of No-soul', however, can never be defective; because it is always free from all discrepancies and hence always good. For instance, when all impurities have totally disappeared, there cannot come in any discrepancies on the basis of the past perception of things nor can the presence of Love, Hatred and the rest bring about discrepancies in the shape of the burning of the Body and the Mind (?); nor any discrepancies relating to Birth, in the shape of Disease, etc. Because there are no Afflictions which alone bring about Birth. Nor is there any dis. crepancy in the shape of insipidity, as appears in the case of worldly pleasures ; because the pleasures of calm and peace are never galling. Consequently it cannot be right to make any effort to get rid of this knowledge of Nosoul. In fact, if there is any effort, it should be towards not losing hold of the said knowledge ; specially because the Intelligence of man is by its nature partial to what is good.-Nor should there be an effort for the acquiring of the Defects; because they are all evil, being the abode of all troubles.
Thus the conception of No-soul' is quito possible; and when this reaches its highest stage, it has been found to bring about the clear Cognition of things; just as in the case of the love-lorn young man thinking of his beloved ; in the case of such a man, there appear such illusory words as I see her', 'I embrace her and so forth, and there are corresponding bodily reactions also.
Thus then our Reason cannot be regarded as 'inadmissible'.
Nor is our Reason 'Inconclusive'; because the idea of 'No-soul'envisages a well-established fact, and is consequently more powerful than the idea of the
Soul', which is the reverse of it and honce not strong. Thus there is hostility between these two ideas.
Love and Hatred also proceed on the basis of the notion of Soul' which is not well-established; and they are not hostile to one another on account of their envisaging contrary forms. It is not due to mistake; because the two are not brought about by mistakes, and yet they sre themselves mistaken, wrong. Nor is the hostility of these two well recognised ; specially because both have their source in the notion of the Soul. For instance, it is only when one has the notions of 'I' and 'mine' that there appears Hatred against what hampers those, not otherwise ;-and when both proceed from one and the same cause, and are themselves of the nature of cause and effect, they cannot be destructive of one another; just as there is none in the case of Smoke and Fire, both emanating from the same fuel; or just as in the case of the notion of 'T' and affection. If it were not so, there would be incongruitios.-As regards their not appearing simultaneously, that is due to the Mind not having the capacity to project
