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1448
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXVI.
this is not so contrary; as in the latter case, it would be possible for both to co-exist. For instance, when it is said that there can be no coolness of touch here as there is Fire', we have the affirmation of Firs which is directly contrary to coolness, from which affirmation follows the negation of coolness; the same should be the case with the negation of the Omniscient Person also. Similarly, the negation of the Omniscient Person could follow only from the affirmation of something indirectly contrary to Him, or of something contrary to its Pervader; e.g. coolness is the pervader' of the Icy-touch, the contrary of Coolness is Fire,- and when there is affirmation of this Fire, there follows the negation of the Icy-touch.The said negation of a thing would follow also from the affirmation of something contrary to the cause of that thing: e.g, when there is affirmation of Fire, which is contrary to coolness which is the cause of thrilling chill, there follows the negation of the said chill which is the effect of coolness.-Or, the negation of a thing would follow also from the affirmation of an effect contrary to that thing; e.g. when there is affirmation in regard to a certain place, of the Smoke which is an effect of Fire which is contrary to coolness, there follows the negation of the coolness of touch.-Or the negation of a thing can follow from the apprehension of an effect contrary to the cause of that thing; e.g. when there is perception of Smoke which is the effect of Fire which is contrary to coolness which is the cause of thrilling chill, there follows the negation of this chill; the argument being- This place cannot contain a person who has caught the chill, because we find here Smoke Or again the negation of a thing may follow from the affirmation of something invariably concomitant with the contrary of that thing; e.g. when there is affirmation of dependence which is invariably concomitant with impermanence which is contrary to Permanence, there follows the negation of Permanence.
Now none of these arguments for negation is applicable to the proving of the non-existence of the Omniscient Person ; because the Omniscient Person is always inapprehensible, while all the conditions described are cases of negation of things that are apprehensible.
This is what is pointed out in the following
TEXTS (3275-3276). FOR THESE REASONS, THE OMNISCIENT PERSON CANNOT BE ONE CAPABLE OF BEING PERCEIVED '; IF HE were CAPABLE OF BEING PERCEIVED, THEN THAT ALONE WOULD ESTABLISH HIS OMNISCIENCE, WITHOUT ANY EFFORT ON OUR PART. IN FACT, HOW CAN THAT PERSON BE PERCEPTIBLE TO YOU WHO HAS KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THINGS, UNLESS YOU ALSO HAD THE
KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THINGS ?-(3276-3276)
COMMENTARY For the reasons explained above, for fear of incurring self-contradiction, you cannot regard the Omniscient Person as 'apprehensible' by yourself. As in that case it would mean that you are yourself omniscient.
