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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXVI.
TEXTS (3271-3272). WHEN THERE IS ABSENCE OF (a) THE CAUSE' AND (() THE PERVADER', IT IS ONLY RIGHT AND PROPER THAT THERE SHOULD BE ABSENCE OF (a) THE CAUSED' AND (6) THE · PERVADED '; (a) BECAUSE THE BIRTH OF THE ONE PROCEEDS FROM THE OTHER, AND (6) BECAUSE ONE IS OF THE SAME NATURE AS THE OTHER-FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN THERE IS ABSENCE OF (a) THE FIRE AND (6) THE TREE, THERE IS ABSENCE OF (a) THE SMOKE AND (6) THE
MANGO-TREE, ETC.'-IF IT WERE NOT SO, (a) THE ONE COULD NOT BE THE CAUSE OF THE OTHER, AND (6) THERE WOULD BE DIVERSITY -
(3271-3272)
COMMENTARY 'Caused that which has a cause ; i.e. the effect-the Duandea compound is between 'caused' and 'pervaded' these two are construed with the foregoing 'nivsttiryujyale ', -the meaning being that it is only right and proper that there should be absence of the Caused and the Pervaded.
The reason for this is supplied— Because the birth of the one, etc. etc.' -(a) When there is absence of Cause, there is absence of Effect, because the Effect derives its existence from the Cause; e.g. when there is absence of Fire, there is absence of Smoke. (b) Similarly when there is absence of the Pervader, there is absence of the Pervaded; because the Pervaded is of the same essence as the Pervader-both being of the same nature ; e.g. when there is absence of the Tree, there is absence of the Mango, Khadira and other particular Trees; because it is only a particular Tree that is known as the mango'.
If it were not 80,-i.e. if on the absence of the Cause, the Effect were not absent, then the Cause would not be a true cause at all. Because when one thing can be present even when the other is absent, the latter cannot be the cause of the former; otherwise, there would be absurdities. Similarly when one thing is not absent when the other is absent, they cannot be of the same nature, e.g. the Cow and the Gavaya. Hence it follows that when the Pervader is absent, the Pervaded must be absent, and where the Cause is absent, the Effoot must be absent; it would not imply the absence of any. thing else ; as that would lead to incongruities.
This has been thus declared Thus when a certain nature is related to a thing, its absence would imply the absence of that thing; and the absence of the cause would imply the absence of the effect; because of the infallibility of their relationship. If it were not so, why should the absence of the one mean the absence of the other ? Because a man has no horse, does it mean that he should have no Cow either ?'-(3271-3272)
If it is insisted upon by the other party that one's own Apprehension is the Cause and Pervader of all things—then his Proposition involves selfcontradiction. This is pointed out in the following
