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EXAMINATION OF THE 'PERSON OF SUPER-NORMAL VISION'. 1447
TEXTS (3273-3274).
IF YOUR OWN APPREHENSION IS RECOGNISED THROUGH SOME MEANS OF COGNITION, AS BEING THE CAUSE' AND THE PERVADER', OF ALL THINGS, THEN YOUR OWN OMNISCIENCE BECOMES ESTABLISHED, WITHOUT ANY EFFORT. WHY THEN SHOULD YOU YOURSELF
BE HOSTILE TO YOUR OWN OMNISCIENCE ?-(3273-3274)
COMMENTARY.
Hätutvavyāpakatvayoh'-The Genitive Ending is in relation to Enishchaya'.
Upalambhasya charthësu-The Genitive Ending in Upalambhasya', and the Locative Ending in arthēşu' is in reference to the Cause' and the
Pervader'; the former connoting the relationship of these, and the latter the fact of their being envisager.
What is mennt is as follows:- If, through some Means of Cognition, you have recognised the fact of your own Apprehension being the 'Cause' and 'Porvader of all things then, your own omniscience becomes clearly asserted; because unless one is omniscient, his Apprehension can never comprehend all things. And yet you are putting forward proofs in support of the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. Thus there is clear selfcontradiction on your part.-(3273-3274)
Thus it has been shown that mere Non apprehension, without a qualification, does not deserve to be put forward as proving the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. Nor will it be right to put forward Non-apprehension as qualified by the phrase of what fulfills the conditions of apprehensibility, as the reason for denying the existence of that person.-Because when such
Non-apprehension is put forward, it could be put forward, (a) either directly by itself,- for instance, as the argument the Jar does not exist, because while conditions of being apprehended are present, it is not apprehended', so also would be the argument proving the non-existence of the Omniscient Person or (b) indirectly, by other words, by pointing out the absence of something which is the Pervader of its cause and which is apprehensible ; e.g. when it is said 'There can be no Smoke here because there is no Fire', or The particular tree Shimshapă cannot be here, as there is no Tree at all. It has been already explained that the absence of one thing does not necessarily mean the absence of another, except when they are invariable concomitants or when one is the Cause' or the Pervader' of the other. For if it did, there would be incongruities. Nor does mere absence of the Cause' and the Pervader' prove the absence of the thing the absence of whose 'Cause' and 'Porvader' has not been definitely ascertained. So here also it would be necessary to add the qualifying phrase that it should fulfill the conditions of apprehensibility. This same principle would apply to the case of the Omniscient Person also.
Or, the negation of a thing can follow only from the affirmation of something else which is directly or indirectly contrary to the former, not if
