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EXAMINATION OF THE 'PERSON OF SUPER-NORMAL VISION'. 1443
are asserting is the Relative Nogation, Negation of omniscience, in relation to all men; so that there is certainly room for the operation of Inference and other Means of Cognition".
It may be so; but even so, Inference is not possible ; because there is no Indicative (Probans) known to be present in all men, which is invariably concomitant with Omniscience. Such character as being knowable', being a Teacher' and so forth, which have been put forward, all these are Inconclusive, as we are going to show later on.
Nor again is Presumption able to prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. Because, in the first place, we do not admit of any Moans of Cognition apart from Perception and Inference. Secondly, even if there are other Means of Cognition, Presumption is not capable of proving the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. Because Presumption is based upon the idea that a certain well known fact-seen or heard of, is not explicable otherwise than on the basis of the unseen factor which is thus presumed and as a matter of fact, there is no well-known fact-seen or heard of-among men, which is not explicable except on the basis of the non-existence of the Omniscient Person, which, therefore, should be presumed.
Nor is Analogy able to prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. What is cognised by means of Analogy is, either the remembered thing having for its adjunct the similarity of the thing before the eyes,-or mere similarity of the thing before the eyes, to the Remembered Thing. For example, when a man who has had the perception of the Cow goes to the forest, and sees the Gavaya there, he perceives in this latter, the similarity to the Cow. This has been thus declared Thus what is remembered and perceived as similar, forms the object of Analogy,or the Similarity itself' (Shlokavārtika Upamāna, 37). Thus the object that is remembered forms the objoct of Analogical Cognition; and what is remembered is only what has been apprehended before, not anything else ;- and there is no Omniscient Person who has apprehended the Cognitions occurring in the Chain of all men; hence these could not be remembered by any one. Nor is there anything apprehended by all men which is definitely known as possessing properties in com. mon with non-omniscience, on the basis of which the non-omniscient character of all men could be cognised through Analogy.--As regards the quality of * existence etc. which has been found in the non-Omniscient Person, those also have not been found to be in common with non-omniscience. Besause the quality of existence is not incompatible with the Omniscient Person also. Further, the perception of existence in the Garaya does not lead to the Analogical Cognition of the Jar being similar to the Garaya. All men may be alike on the ground of being existent; but that does not prove their non-omniscience.
This also refutes the argument that has been set forth by the other party under the Text 3216
Nor again can Word, as the Means of Cognition, set aside the existence of the Omniscient Person.-As regards the Word emanating from human beings, that is regarded by the Mimümsaka as itself unreliable in matters beyond the senses. And as regards the Word not emanating from human beings, that
