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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXVI.
difference is that while one (cessation) donies other things and expresses the one thing meant, the other (* ceased') expresses the same thing without denying other things. In reality, both terms express the non-existence of the thing concerned. What again is non-existent cannot be & cause ; and nonexistence is characterised by the absence of all potencies. It is for this reason that when one thing is productive or illuminative of another, it is so productive or illuminative only when its existence is there, not when its exist. ence has ceased; e.g. the Seed which is productive of the sprout, and the Lamp which is illuminative of colour, and when these two (Seed and Lamp) have ceased, they are not able to do the producing or the illuminating,
Further, what is the meaning of the statement that "Perception, having ceased, proves non-existence" ? If the meaning is that Perception has ceased, disappeared, from the present state,--then it would imply that it is there in the past' and 'future 'states; and it has been already proved that the past and the future' thing does not exist at all ;how then could there be any operation of what is non-existent 2-If, secondly, the meaning of the statement is that though existing at the present time, it does not come about (appear) in connection with a certain thing, and it is in this sense that Perception is said to have ceased' (become inapplicable),
even so, this cannot prove the non-existence of the thing in question ; as the premiss would be wrong and fallible; as the more fact that Visual Perception does not appear in connection with Odour, Taste, etc. cannot prove that these latter do not exist.-Thus Perception cannot prove the nonexistence of anything.
Says the Opponent)" If that is so, then how is it that, on the basis of Perception, in the form of Non-apprehension, you declare, in another place, the non-existence of the Jar?"
This is not so. What is said there is, not that Perception provos non. existence of the thing because the thing is envisaged by Non-apprehension, but that, when two things are capable of figuring in the same Cognition, if only one appears there, it means the non-appearance (non-existence) of the other. And the reason for this lies in the fact that both cannot be cognised in one and the same form, on the ground that the capability is equally present in both.-In the case in question however, we have never definitely cognised the fact of Omniscience figuring in the same Cognition as anything else ; the presence of which latter could lead us to deduce the non-existence of Omniscience; because this latter is always absolutely imperceptible.
Thus it is clear that Perception cannot annul the notion of the Omniscient Person.
(B) Nor can Inference prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. Because it is held that Inference always envisages affirmation ; as is clear from the fact that it is only Non-apprehension that has been regarded as envisaging negation. For this same reason, the other three Means of Cognition, Prosumption (Analogy and Word) cannot prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person.
The following might be urged—" When we assert that there is no Omniscient Person, we are not asserting an absolute negation; all that we
