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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXVI.
TEXT (3145).
"IF THE PERSON HAS THE DIRECT PERCEPTION OF ALL THINGS, THEN HE SHOULD HAVE DIREOT KNOWLEDGE OF SUCH TASTES, ETC. ALSO AS ARE UNCLEAN WHO COULD ASSUME THE EXIS
TENCE OF SUCH A PERSON?”-(3145)
COMMENTARY.
The following might be urged-The omniscience of the Teacher has been inferred by the Buddhists from the fact of His having propounded the teaching of the truth regarding all things; hence this Inference annuls the Mimāmsaka's 'Proposition '[that 'there can be no Omniscient Person "); and his Reason also is inadmissible.
Anticipating this objection, the Mimämsaka supplies the following answer -
TEXT (3146).
"As A MATTER OF FACT, THE WORDS OF THE BUDDHA AND OTHERS ARE NOT FOUND TO PROVIDE ANY KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT IS CONTAINED IN THE Vedas, THE Upavedas AND THE SUBSIDIARY SCIENCES AND THEIR AUXILIARIES; HOW THEN CAN SUCH A PERSON BE REGARDED AS OMNISCIENT', WITHOUT REASON ?"
--(3146)
COMMENTARY.
Vedas-named 'RR!, Yajus and Saman' Uparadas -Ayurveda, Dhanurvēda and the like. Subsidiary Sciences--the six subsidiaries of the Veda, in the shape of Shilpa, Kalpa, Vyakarana, Nirukta, Chhandas and Jyotiņa.- Atiliaries '-the parts of these, in the shape of Verbal Roots, ete, including the Commentaries, etc. of these.
The artha' of these is what is contained in them.
Of this artha', 'contents', of the said works, no knowledge is provided by the words of Buddha and other Teachers. That is, no words of the Buddha are found to expound what is contained in the Veda, eto. As a matter of fact, no such Person is found who has composed a Scripture that provides the knowledge of all things; the reason for this being that the various scriptures are found to deal with different subjects.-(3146)
It might be argued that when it is found that the Teachings of Buddha deal with a few things, it is inferred that He knows those things also which have not been taught by him, from the perceived fact that He is possessed of the requisite capacity; hence the said objection (annulment by Inference) against the Mimāmsaka's proposition still remains.
This is anticipated and answered in the following :
