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BXAMINATION OF THE PERSON OF SUPER-NORMAL VISION'. 1419
things; and this fact of the Cognition envisaging all things cannot be recognised unless the things comprehended by that Cognition are known; for instance, the Cognition of the man with the stick' is not possible unless one knows the stick. --This argument may be formulated as follows:- When the Cognition of one thing forms the necessary adjunct of the Cognition of another thing, there can be no Cognition of the latter thing without the Oognition of the former thing :-e.g. the Cognition of the stick being the necessary adjunct of the Cognition of the man with the stick, there is no Cogni. tion of the man with the stick unless there is Cognition of the stick ;-the Cognition of things cognised by the Omniscient Person, which is the necessary adjunct of the Cognition of the Omniscient Person himself, is not possible for men of limited vision; hence there is non-apprehension of the more. extensive character (which implies the absence of the less extensive); because the Cognition of the necessary adjunct is more extensive (wider) than the Cognition of that to which the said adjunct belongs; and the former is absent in the case in question.
Thus then, even in the case of a man contemporaneous with the Omnis. cient Person, unless such a man is himself omniscient, he cannot know the Omniscient Person; so that for such a man, even the assertions of Omnis. cient Persons would be of doubtful veracity and hence unreliable; as the basis of it-the grounds of certainty regarding reliability, in the shape of the definite cognition of the Cognitions of the Omniscient Person would be absent.
As in the case of the assertion of ordinary men'-.e, of the assertion of common people.-(3192-3193)
The following view might be put forward :-Without any effort the Omniscient Person makes his omniscience known to his disciples by attracting their minds through His unfailing knowledge of their character and the workings of their mind.
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXTS (3194-3195).
"EVEN IF A PERSON WERE TO COMPREHEND THE THINGS KNOWN TO ALL HIS DISCIPLES, HE WOULD NOT BE OMNISCIENT'; AS HE WOULD BE DEVOID OF THE COMPREHENSION OF THE THINGS KNOWN TO PEOPLE OTHER THAN THOSE DISCIPLES. NOR IS IT POSSIBLE TO COMPREHEND ALL THE THINGS COGNISED BY ALL MEN; AS THERE CAN BE NO COMING TOGETHER OF MEN OF THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE, INHABITING ALL THE THREE REGIONS
OF THE WORLD."-(3194-3195)
COMMENTARY. Even if the man who knew only those things that were known to the people contemporaneous with, and in close proximity to, himself, he could
