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EXAMINATION OF THE PERSON OF SUPER-NORMAL VISION. 1437
WOULD BE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO SUCH DIVERSE ENTITIES AS THE DISCIPLE, THE OMNISCIENT PERSON, Dharma, Adharma, AND THE TEACHINGS OF THE SAID PERSON; AS THE DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THESE WOULD NOT BE COGNISED.-IF THE ONE UNIFORM COGNITION BE HELD TO BE false, THE OMNISCIENT PERSON TURNS OUT TO BE A DELUDED PERSON; SO THAT NO CONFIDENCE SHOULD BE REPOSED IN HIS WORDS, WHICH ARE LIKE THE WORDS OF DEMENTED AND INTOXICATED MEN.-IF THEN THE OMNISCIENT PERSON IS HELD TO BE THAT PERSON WHO APPREHENDS ALL THINGS AND THEIR CAUSES, THROUGH A SINGLE ABNORMAL COGNITION BROUGHT ABOUT BY COMMUNION, - THEN THERE CAN BE NO MEANS OF COGNITION TO VOUCH FOR His EXISTENCE, IN THE SHAPE OF PERCEPTION OR INFERENCE OR WORD, THAT IS NOT PRODUCED BY THAT PERSON HIMSELF. HENCE THE CONCLUSION WOULD BE THAT SUCH A PERSON DOES NOT EXIST - WHETHER SIMULTANEOUSLY OR SUCCESSIVELY, HOW COULD THERE BE ANY INFERENCE WITHOUT AN EFFECT ?-As A MATTER OF FACT, A CERTAIN PERSON CAN EITHER HAVE NO POTENCY AT ALL, OR IF HE HAS, THEN HE WOULD HAVE ALL POTENCIES; SO THAT ALL BEINGS WOULD BE ABLE TO HAVE THE COGNITION OF ALL THINGS. AND YET AS A MATTER OF FACT, WANTING IN THE NECESSARY MEANS, PEOPLE DO NOT COGNISE ALL THINGS.-THE IDEA THAT THERE IS ONE PERSON WHO HAS ACQUIRED SPECIAL POWERS NOT COMMON AMONG MEN, AND HE KNOWS ALL THINGS '-IS ENTIRELY BASELESS.-THUS THEN, NO OMNISCIENT PERSON OF ANY KIND IS CONCEIVABLE. CONSEQUENTLY NO HUMAN ASSERTION COULD BE THE MEANS OF PROVIDING THE KNOWLEDGE OF Dharma."-3247-3261)
COMMENTARY.
Does the man regarded as omniscient know all things at one and the same time? Or in succession, one after the other 2-Or, does He apprehend the whole world as one, in one form, such as eternal and the like ? Or only the more important things--those for instance that are useful to men, such as the effects following from Acts and so forth ?--Or is He called 'omniscient because He possesses the capacity to know all things like Fire, which, though not actually devouring all things, either simultaneously or in succession, is yet called 'all-devourer'?
Under the first alternative, two alternative views are possible. Does He know all things simultaneously through a single Cognition ? Or through several Cognitions ?-He could not know them through a single Cognition ; because never has it been seen that several mutually contradictory things, such as the pure and the impure-are apprehended by a single Cognition.
It might be argued that what happens is that at one and the same time there exist in Him several Cognitions envisaging the various mutually con. tradictory things.
