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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXVI.
TEXT (3191). " FOR THE PROVING OF THE EXISTENCE OF ONE OMNISCIENT PERSON, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO ASSUME SEVERAL OMNISCIENT PERSONS; AND IF A SINGLE ONE OF THESE HAPPEN TO BE NOT-OMNISOIENT, HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO RECOGNISE THE
OMNISCIENT PERSON."-(3191)
COMMENTARY.
If for the purpose of proving the existence of one Omniscient Person, one goes on following up a series of Omniscient Persons, no man with limited vision could ever get at certainty regarding the Omniscient Person,-even at the end of his whole life; hence several Omniscient Persons wonld have to be assumed. (See Shlokavårtika 1. 1. 2, 138. (3191)
Then again, we shall lay aside, for the present, the idea that people of the present day are incapable of knowing the Omniscient Person as no such is present before them; as a matter of fact, even people who lived at the same time as that Person could not know him, because they would themselves be not-omniscient. This is what is pointed out in the following:
TEXTS (3192-3193).
"AS A MATTER OF FACT, EVEN THE CONTEMPORARIES OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON COULD NOT KNOW HIM AS OMNISCIENT', AS THEY WOULD BE DEVOID OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE COGNITIONS OF THAT PERSON [OR, OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE THINGS COGNISED BY THAT PERSON). [SEE Shlokavārtika 1. 1. 2, 134). AND IN THE OMNISCIENT PERSON IS NOT RECOGNISED BY ANY ONE, YOR THAT MAN, THE ASSERTION OF THAT OMNISCIENT PERSON COULD NOT BE RELIABLE ; AS THE VERY BASIS OF THAT ASSERTION WOULD BE UNKNOWN--AS IN THE CASE OF THE ASSERTION OF OTHER ORDINARY MEN."
[See Shlokavārtika 1. 1. 2, 136.—(3192-3193)
COMMENTARY.
The compound 'tajjñānajñèya, etc. etc.' is to be expounded as--they are devoid of-without-that Cognition which has for its object-i.e. which envisages-the Cognitions of the Omniscient Person' Or as 'who are devoid of the Cognition of all the things cognised by that Person', -because he is himself not omniscient.
By merely looking at the body, one does not conclude that he is omnis. cient'; because such conclusion must be accompanied by the recognition of the presence of exceptional knowledge in the Person); this exceptional knowledge, in order to be able to prove omniscience, must envisage all
