________________
1386
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXV.
that the capacity which is not present in the thing itself cannot be brought about by anything else, i.e. by anything else besides the causes bringing about the Cognition itself.”
The following might be urged against the above view -As a matter of fact, the causes of cognitions are common to valid as well as invalid cognitions ; how then could validity be invariably concomitant with the mere character of being the cause of cognitions' 1-From this it is clonr thnt validity is due to other circumstantial causes, not merely to the cause of the cognition itself. This other circumstantial cause must be one that is accompanied by excellences : so that the cause of validity would consist also in the ex. cellences of the Sense-organs and other Instruments of Cognition. In the Case of Verbal Cognition the excellence of this other cause, as ascertained from actual experience, consists in being composed (spoken) by a trustworthy person'. So that there being no such composer (or Spenker) in the ease of the Veda, it would have to be regarded as invalid.
The answer to this (provided by Ubêyaka) is as follows:-"What has been just asserted does not affect our position; because it cannot be proved that validity is due to other circumstantial causes. It is not possible for us to recognise any positive functioning of the Excellences towards the bringing about of the effect in the shape of validity; what produces the idea of the cognition being in conformity with the real state of things is the cause in the shape of the Sense-organs and other Means of Cognition them. selves, independently of anything else. As regards tho function of the ointment (applied to the Eyes to remove defective vision), that tends only towards the removal of defects, and not to the producing of excellences".
It might be argued that—The Sense-organs and the other Means of Cognition are there in the case of the invalid cognition also ; so that under the above view, validity should be produced in all cases: as the cause of it would be there in its efficient condition.
“This is not so,"-says Ubəyaka—" because after the defects have been cured, other causes would become operative towards the bringing about of particular effects".
The following might be urged :-Why is not the contrary of this accepted --that the Sense-organs and other Means of Cognition bring about wrong cognitions, independently of other things, and that on the cure of the excellences, other circumstantial causes become operative towards bringing about the right cognition in conformity with the real state of things ?
Ubèyaka's answer to this is as follows: "True; this is so ; but through positive and negative concomitence, it has been found in the case of Inference, that what brings about the validity is that same presence of three factors' which brings about the cognition itself; and hence it is assumed that in the caso of Perception also, the validity would be produced by the same cause that produces the cognition. As regards the wrong cognition, on the other hand, it is an effect that is not found to be produced by the Sense-organs and other Means of Cognition, and hence it leads to the assumption that it must be due to other circumstantial causes.-Thus there can be no objection to our explanation of validity".
