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EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF 'SELF-SUFFICIENT VALIDITY'.
1389
If that is so, then the Sense-organ by itself, independently of every. thing else, cannot turn out to be the cause; because, even when the Senseorgan is there in its efficient condition, its effoct, in the shape of Validity, does not come about. What is independent of everything else can never fail to be productive of its effect; and when between two things, ono does not come about even when the other is there, the former cannot be regarded as having the latter as its only cause; if it did so, there would be incongruities.
Then again, you have got to explain this-If Validity has its efficient cause present in its perfect condition, why is it that it does not come about, even when the Defects are thore 2-If the answer is that," it does not come about on account of the presence of the Defect, which is a cause operating against the Validity", -then, the same may be said regarding Invalidity also ; it does not come about at the time on account of the presence of the Sense-organ, etc. which are the cause operating against the Invalidity.
Further, even if the Validity were unwilling to como about because it is afraid of the Defect which operates against it-how could its own cause which is present there in its officient condition, ignore the effect? In fact, the untrammelled potency of the cause would be manifested only if it forced the effect to come about, even though unwilling.--If the idea is that the Sense-organ would not bring about Validity, when its potency would be obstructed by the presence of Defects, then, being impotent, it could not bring about the Cognition either. Otherwise it would not be true that "Validity is brought about by the cause of the Cognition itself”; as it would not come about even when the Cognition has come about. If between two things, one is not produced even when the other has been produced, then both cannot be regarded as necessarily having the same cause ; as for instance, when the paddy-sprout is not produced on the production of the Kodravasprout ;-and it has been found that even when the Cognition has been produced, its Validity is not always produced ; hence there is non-apprehension of the wider character. -Then again, when a Potency forms the very essence of a thing, nothing can obstruct it, without destroying the nature of that thing. Thus then it may be possible to assert as follows-Please accept the view that there is validity of all Apprehensions, because the Potency which is inherent in a thing cannot be destroyed by anything else (a parody of Kumārila's assertion).
The following might be urged--" What is held to be the cause of validity is not the mere Sense-organ and other Means of Cognition, but only such Sense-organ, etc. as are free from defects ; so that the above objections are not applicable".
If that is so, then it comes to this that what brings about the Validity is the Sense-organ as along with Excellences-which is something different from the cause of the Cognition itself; because it is only when a thing is equipped with Excellence that it can be free from defects. Thus you cannot say that "the validity is not known to be brought about by other circumstantial causes ".
"What the Excellences operate towards is the removal of defects, not the producing of validity".
