Book Title: Tattva Sangraha Vol 2
Author(s): Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra

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Page 671
________________ 1396 TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXVI. (a) Perception being restricted in its scope to the five objects, in the shape of Colour, ote. cannot apply to Dharma and Adharma; (6) Inference also envisaging the subject as related to the Probans which has been cognised by Perception, cannot appertain to Dharma and Adharma ; becauso Dharma, etc.-are beyond the reach of the senses ; hence no relationship of those with anything can be apprehended by Perception (c) as regards the Word, even though it appertains wholly to imperceptible things, yet through verbal cognition one cannot be regarded as perceiving supersensuous things'; because verbal cognition, envisaging imperceptible things, cannot be of the nature of Perception; and the man who is wholly addicted to nonperceptional cognition can never be one ' perceiving suporsensuous things' (d) as regards Analogy, envisaging Similarity and its adjuncts, can never apply to Dharma and Adharma; as has been thus declared-Hence what is remembered would be qualified by similarity,--and this would be the object of Analogical Cognition; or the similarity as resting in that thing (Shlokavārtika-Analogy, 37);-(@) as regards Prosumption, it envisages only a thing different from the one in question, which, as heard of or seen, would be inexplicable without that other thing; hence, it cannot appertain to Dharma and Adharma; as there is nothing either seen or heard of, which cannot be explained without the presumption of Dharma and Adharma. Even if Presumption does envisage Dharma and Adharma,-it cannot bo of the nature of Perception; hence one who rests upon it cannot be said to be directly perceiving Dharma and Adharma' as regards Non-apprehension, as it envisages only the absence of cognisable things, it can never envisage Dharma and Adharma.-(3135) Thus it has been explained that the attempt to prove the Omniscient Person on the basis of the knowledge of the epitomised form of things, is superfluous. The Mimāmsaka now proceeds to point out objections against the idea of the Omniscient Person', on the basis of his knowing the whole world in detail : TEXT (3136). 'IY ONE ASSUMES THE EXISTENCE OF A PERSON CAPABLE OF DIRECTLY PERCEIVING ALL THINGS IN DETAIL, --SUCH ASSUMPTION IS ABSOLUTELY FUTILE AND FALSE."-(3136) COMMENTARY. 31 wha'-Futile, useless; because it is not conducive to the fulfilment of any purpose of man. False '---not true, as envisaging an impossibility.-(3136) The following Text shows in what way it is an impossibility,

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