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EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF SELF-SUFFICIENT VALIDITY'. 1385
cognition, it is quite possible that there should be validity” (as asserted above). Because if Validity were held to be a particular form of Cognition, -then alone could there be any justification for the pointing out of the falsity of the premiss that the same validity is due to the presence of excellences--not of anything else. As a matter of fact, however, when it has been assorted that "it is present also in wrong cognition', the falsity pointed out is not in the premiss that the particular form of Cognition is due to the prosence of excellences ',-but in regard to Cognition in general ; and the other party does not hold that cognition in general is brought about by excellencer; it is only a particular cognition that is held to be so brought about ; and it is not possible to point out falsity in the premiss that 'a particular cognition is brought about by excellences'.
Then again, we also do not hold the extraneous validity to be due to excellences; by denying which you are seeking to prove inherent validity. What we hold is that a particular cognition, even though apprehended, might be due to a mistake, and as such it cannot bring about the certainty of conviction in accordance with the said apprehension; hence it is concluded that validity, being due to the appearance of the said conviction, must be extraneous.
Further, the same may be said in regard to Invalidity also ; as followsInvalidity is of the essence of cognition and this is natural and inherent in cognitions, and not due to defects; because it is possible even when there is no defect, as in the case of Right Cognition; that is why Invalidity is said to be inherent; and all that the defects do is to set aside the Excel. lences ; hence it is for the setting aside of the excellences, that the Invalidity needs the defects,--not for the bringing about of the Invalidity itself.
Thus there is nothing in the explanation put forward above by some people.
Ubēyaka, on the other hand, has declared as follows "The validity of cognitions consists, not in their being of the nature of Consciousness, but in being in conformity with the real state of things; because, in a case where there is Consciousness, if there is no conformity with the real state of things,the cognition is invalid; e.g. the cognition of silver in regard to the piece of shell; and conversely, even when there is no Consciousness, if there is conformity with real state of things, the cognition is valid ; e.g. the cognition of smoke in Fire. Hence from this positive and negative concomitance, it follows that Validity consists in being in conformity with the real state of things ".
"The cognition of this conformity proceeds from that same cause which brings about the original cognition itself, not from any other cir. cumstantial conditions ; it is in this sense that the validity of cognitions is spoken of as inherent in themselves ;-the term 'sva' (in the word ' svatah') stands for svaliya', 'what belongs to oneself'; so that the word 'svatah means 'due to its own cause'. The second half of the passage-the capacity which is not present in the thing itself cannot be produced in it by something else', only serves to point out the reason for denying the idea of its being brought about by other circumstances; the meaning being
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