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1384
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXV.
TEXT (3123).
FOR THESE REASONS PLEASE ACCEPT THE VIEW THAT THERE HAS BEEN AN AUTHOR OF THE VEDA,ONE WHO IS CAPABLE OF SEEING THINGS BEYOND THE SENSES, WHO HAS SHAKEN OF THE ENTIRE MASS OF DARKNESS AND IGNORANCE, AND WHO IS CONVERSANT WITH THE MEANING OF THE VEDA AND ITS DIVISIONS.
-(3123)
COMMENTARY. Darkness-ie. Ignorance, afflicted as well as 'unafflicted' [vide Yogasūtra "Vytlayah-klistaklistáh'); the mass of this Ignorance has been shaken off by him conversant with its divisions '-i.e. the right expounder
* Authori.e. of the Veda.
Thus it has been established that the Proposition (of the Mimāmsaka) is found to be entirely annulled by Moans of Valid Cognition, his Reason, in the shape of being present when the other is present', is Inconclusive, the proof for the Reason (adduced by the Buddhist) being present where the Probandum is present has been already indicated above, under Text 2939.
As regards the four alternatives set forth (by the Mimāmsaka) under the commentary on Text 2811, [(1) Both validity and invalidity are inherent in cognitions,-(2) Both are extraneous at times,-(3) Validity is inherent and Invalidity is extraneous,--and (4) Validity is extraneous and Invalidity is inherent), and the objections urged against three of them, they do not affect the Buddhists at all. Because they do not accept any of these alternatives, their view being that there can be no hard and fast rule in the matter; as it has been already explained that both these, Validity and Invalidity, may be sometimes inherent and sometimes extraneous. Hence it was not right to put forward the said four alternatives only; as fifth alternative was also possible that there can be no hard and fast rule applying to all cases.
Other people have offered an entirely different explanation of the Proposition (regarding the self-validity of Cognitions) :-" Validity consists in being of the nature Consciousness; hence it must be natural (inherent) in all cognitions-it cannot be due to the presence of any excellences; as oven in the absence of excellences, when there is wrong cognition, it is quite possible that there should bo the essence of cognition'. It is for this reason and in this sense that Cognition is spokon of as self-valid'. All that the excellences do is to remove the defects; hence for the removal of defects, the validity of the cognition needs the excellences; and these are not needed for the bringing about of the validity itself".
The above view cannot be right. Because it is not correct to say that validity consists in being of the nature of Consciousness ; as in that case there would be validity in wrong cognitions also. If it be held that,"Validity is a particular form of Cognition itself", then it should not be said that"Validity is natural and inherent in cognitions, and not brought about by excellences; because even in the absence of excellences, when there is wrong
