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1116
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XXIV.
and reliable':-.g. the certain cognition of fire that the man has who desires heat for cooking and whose mind is not under delusion ;--and the Cognition arising from the Vedic sentences speaking of the Agnihotra, etc. is free from doubt and mistake; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of the thing.
Na-avalambita'-is to be construed with (as governing) ' pramānatām! Tām kurvan bringing about such cognition.—(2387-2388)
The author answers the above argument in the following
TEXTS (2389-2390).
IT IS NOT SO; BECAUSE UNCERTAINTY DOES ARISE (IN THE CASE OF THE
VEDIC SENTENCE), JUST IN THE SAME WAY AS IN THE CASE OF ANOTHER ASSERTION TO THE CONTRARY; AND INTELLIGENT PEOPLE DO NOT PERCEIVE ANY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO CASES. IN FACT, IN REGARD TO THINGS BEYOND THE SENSES, THERE CAN BE NO CERTAINTY REGARDING THEIR existence or non-existence.IF IT BE URGED THAT-"THIS CERTAINTY DOES ARISE FROM THE VEDIC SENTENCE", THEN THE ANSWER IS—WHY CANNOT THERE BE CERTAINTY REGARDING THE CONTRARY OF THAT, FROM ANOTHER SENTENCE 1—(2389-2390)
COMMENTARY.
If your Reason means that the notion that intelligent men obtain from the Veda is free from uncertainty, etc.-then it is not 'admissible'; because the notion that the intelligent man has of Agnihotra leading to Heaven is just as uncertain as that of Agnihotra not leading to Heaven; in fact, in the matter of all supersensuous things, there can be no cause for any absolutely certain cognition as to the thing being existent or non-existent; because the corroboration of the actual perception of the real state of things is equally unavailable in both cases.
*As in the case of another assertion to the contrary'-The 'vati' affix is added to the word with the Locative ending.
It might be argued that "the certainty is obtained from the Vedic sentence itself; why seek for another cause for it ?”
The answer to this is Why cannot there be, etc. etc.'i.e. certainty contrary to what is asserted in the Vedio sentence.
From another sentence'-i.e. from one emanating from a man.
Why cannot there be '-.e. there must be.--Hence that also should be regarded as valid and reliable; as the absence of sublation' would be equally available in both cases.-(2389-2390)
It might be argued that-"As a matter of fact intelligent Vedic scholars do actually obtain unshakeable notions from the Veda; hence the Reason cannot be * inadmissible".