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1310
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXV.
The following might be urged until the Cognition itself has been cognised, the apprehension of its objective cannot be possible, as has been thus declared- There can be no perception of the object for one who has had no perception of the Cognition itself'.
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXTS (2911-2912).
"JUST AS OBJECTS ARE APPREHENDED BY THE EYE AND OTHER SENSEORGANS, WHICH LATTER ARE THEMSELVES UNCOGNISED, -S0, IN THE SAME MANNER ARE THINGS APPREHENDED BY COGNITIONS ALSO, WITHOUT THESE LATTER BEING THEMSELVES COGNISED. HENCE becoming cognised IS NOT OF MUCH USE IN THE validity OF THE COGNITION. FOR THE SAME REASON THE APPREHENSION OF THINGS ALSO IS OBTAINED FROM THE COGNITION THAT IS ITSELY UNCOGNISED."-(2911-2912)
COMMENTARY.
This is easily understood.-(2011-2912)
If that is so, then the invalidity also of Cognitions could, in the same way, be regarded as inherent in them.--Anticipating this objection, the Mimämsaka provides the following Answer:
TEXT (2913). "LIKE VALID COGNITION, INVALID COGNITION ALSO OPERATES UPON ITS OBJECT, BY ITSELY (INDEPENDENTLY); BUT THE FACT OF ITS BEING false CANNOT BE APPREHENDED WITHOUT ANOTHER
MEANS OF COGNITION." -(2913)
COMMENTARY.
Invalid Cognition also has the semblance of the Valid Cognition, and hence it does apprehend (the 'na' is wrongly put in) the object, by its mere existence; consequently, falsityi.. the fact of its envisaging an unreal thing-cannot be apprehended without another means of Cognition; we are going to show later on that this falsity is extraneous.-(2913)
Says the Opponent-The same is equally true of the valid Cognition also; because that also, in some cases, has the semblance of the Invalid Cognition.
The answer to this is as follows:
