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1338
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXV.
TEXT (2983).
THE FOLLOWING MIGHT BE URGED :-"IT BEING ASCERTAINED THAT ITS VALIDITY IS DUE TO EXTRANEOUS CAUSES, THE Cognition SHOULD BE REGARDED AS 'COGNISED'.-THERE IS NO IN
CONGRUITY IN THIS.(2983)
COMMENTARY.
The following might be urged "The validity of all Cognitions being equally due to extraneous causes, why should there be this distinction ? And under these circumstances, the Cognition itself becomes the object cognised, which is extremely incongruous".
This is the objection urged by the Opponent. The answer to this is that there is no incongruity in this' adah', this.--There is no incongruity in this, as cognition and cognised are relative terms like 'cause' and 'effect', and 'Father' and 'Son':-(2983)
The same idon is further explained
TEXTS (2984-2985).
THE VALIDITY OF THE COGNITION IS ALWAYS ASSERTED IN REFERENCE TO THE THING APPREHENDED BY IT; AND THIS VALIDITY BEING APPREHENDED BY ANOTHER COGNITION, THE FORMER COGNITION DOES BECOME 'COGNISED '; AND THERE IS NO INCONGRUITY IN THIS, AS THE NOTIONS OF COGNITION AND COGNISED' ARE BASED UPON RELATIVITY,AS IN THE CASE OF CAUSE AND EFFECT' AND
THE LIKE.—(2984-2985)
COMMENTARY.
When a certain thing is apprehended by a Cognition, this Cognition itself does not become the cognised ' in relation to itself; but in relation to the other Cognition that asserts its validity, it becomes the 'cognised ',and is not & Cognition'; hence there is no incongruity or 'admixture'; just as one and the same thing, spoken of as 'cause ' and 'effect', in relation to different things, does not make an undue 'admixture':-(2984-2985)
The following Text sums up the argument :
