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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXV.
TEXTS (3022-3023).
IF THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY IS DEPENDENT UPON THE EXIGENCIES OF PLACE, TIME, THE MAN AND THE CIROUMSTANCES, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE DEFINITE COGNITION OF VALIDITY IS DEPENDENT UPON EXTRANEOUS CAUSES. FOR INSTANCE, THE PLACE AND TIME HAVING BEEN ASCERTAINED THROUGH THE ABSENCE OF SUBLATION, THE ASCERTAINMENT OP
THE VALIDITY OF THE INITIAL COGNITION CLEARLY FOLLOWS FROM OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION. (3022.
3023)
COMMENTARY.
In this the Author points out the self-contradiction involved in the position of the other party --For instance, if the Cognition of validity is held to be dependent upon the exigencies of place, time, the man and the attendant circumstances, then it is clearly meant that the validity is due to extraneous causes; because as regards place, time, etc., when it is ascertained by means of other Means of Cognition, that there is no sublation,-it follows that the initial-first-Cognition is valid ;-when this view has been accepted, how can one avoid the conclusion that the validity of Cognitions is due to extraneous causes ? Surely the absence of sublation can be ascertained only by other Means of Cognition. Under the view that the validity of Cogni. tion is inherent in it, all Cognitions would have to be regarded as valid ; in order to avoid this contingency, you will have to assert that 'self-sufficient validity belongs only to that Cognition of which thero is no sublation:and this absence of sublation cannot be cognised by more non-apprehonsion : as such a conclusion would be wrong; hence the said absence can be ascertained only by the non-apprehension of that which would have been apprehended (if it existed); as it is only this that is invariably concomitant with 'absence of sublation'; and this non-apprehension of what would have been apprehended' cannot be any other than that which follows from the Cognition of its conformity with reality - so that it would mean the acceptance of the view that certainty relating to validity can be obtained through other Means of Cognition ; (and this would be contrary to your doctrine of the self-validity of Cognitions),-(3022-3023)
It has been argued by the other party, uncler Text 2882, that "In such dealings as debts, as botweon two parties, while the plaintiff makes only one statement, the defendant makes two, (hence there need be the following up of only three Cognitions]".
The answer to this is as follows:
