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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXV.
TEXTS (3045-3046). IF IT WERE SO, THEN, THERE WOULD BE NO (a) DOUBT, NOR (6) WRONG COGNITION (MISCONCEPTION), IN THE CASE OF THE PERSON RECOGNISED AS TRUSTWORTHY '-IN THE SHAPE OY (a) 'ARE THERE DEFECTS IN THIS PERSON OR NOT?', AND (6) THERE are DEPROTS IN HIM AND YET THERE ARE SUCH DOUBT AND WRONG COGNITION IN SOME MEN : UNTIL IT IS RECOGNISED THAT HE IS THE RECEPTACLE OF EXCELLENCES.
(3045-3046)
COMMENTARY.
If, in bringing about certainty regarding the absence of defects, excellences functioned by their mere presence, then in the case of the person recognised As 'trustworthy', no one could have any Doubt or Misconception in regard to the absence of defects; as both these will have been barred by the certainty. -And yet much is not the case ; so long as the certainty relating to the presence of the excellences does not come about, there certainly do appear Doubt and Misconception regarding the absence of defects. Hence it follows that the excellences are not operative by their mere presence.-(3045-3046)
TEXT (3047).
IF THERE WERN CERTAINTY REGARDING THE SELF-VALIDITY (OF COGNITIONS) EVEN WHEN THERE IS NO COGNITION OF THE ABSENCE OF DEFECTS, THEN, IN REGARD TO THE SPEAKER, THERE COULD NOT BE THE CONTRARY COGNITION SPOKEN OF ABOVE (UNDER
3045).-(3047)
COMMENTARY.
It might bo argued that-" The excellences may not be operative towards the bringing about of the certainty regarding the absence of defects; even so, from the uncertain absence of defects there would follow the certainty rogarding validity" -This also cannot be right; as in that case, as before, there could be no diversity of opinion in regard to the speaker recognised as 'trustworthy'. Because when there is certainty regarding the self-validity of the assertion, there can be no such notions in regard to the person making that assertion, as 'is he telling the truth or not,-or is he not telling the truth at all ?'--The term 'vimati' (contrary Cognition) here stands for Doubt and Misconception ; 'vimati' being 'mati', notion, that is contrary'; and as Doubt envisages both the extremes, it can be regarded as contrary':-(3047)
