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1332
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXV.
investigator would seek for the concomitance of the Probans in a Corroborative Instance ; e.g, in the case of being an effect' and 'non-eternality';
in the case in question, however, the capacity of the cognition to get at its objective is proved by the fact of that being its effect and hence non-separable from it; consequently, similarity cannot serve as an Indicative, in this case.
Says the Opponent--"If that is so, then how is it that your Teacher has made the following assertion in reference to the Materialist :- When the Materialist says that Perception is the only Means of Cognition, and Inference is not so,--and finds that while some particular perceptions are in consonance with the reality of things, while others are not so, the necessary definition could be so propounded only on the basis of Invariable Concomitance--for the benefit of a person who would regulate his activity in accordance with this definition; and the definition thus propounded on the basis of similarity to what has been seen cannot escape from being something inferred'.”
This does not affect us. This assertion has been made by our Teacher with reference to those cognitions of unapprehended things which appear in one's own chain' as well as in the chain of others; that this is so is clear from the subsequent qualifying clause-apart from the cognitions of apprehended things'. If it were not so, if validity in all cases were to be ascertained through similarity, then the qualifying exception apart from the cognitions of apprehended things would be meaningless.
From all this it follows that that cognition, which appears as having all grounds of mistake dispelled by repetition, is self-sufficient in its validity.(2969)
It has been argued by the Mināmsaka, under Text 2854, that," Just as the first cognition would need corroboration by the second cognition, so should we seek for the corroboration of that corroborative cognition also ".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXTS (2970-2972). IF NO DIFFERENCE IS PERCEIVED, -THEN, ON ACCOUNT OF THE SUS
PICION OF THE THING BEING OTHERWISE THAN COGNISED, THERE CAN BE NO CERTAINTY REGARDING VALIDITY, UNLESS THERE IS A COGNITION ENVISAGING THE RESULTANT EFFECT. IN SUCH A CASE EVEN THOUGH THE VALIDITY MAY BE PRESENT THERE, IT CANNOT BE ASCERTAINED ; IT IS RECOGNISED ONLY THROUGH THE SUBSEQUENT COGNITION OF ITS RESULTANT ACTIVITY. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE first COGNITION NEEDS ITS CORROBORATION; AND FOR THE SAME REASON IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO SEEK FOR THE CORROBORATION OF THE CORROBORATIVE COGNITION ALSO.-(2970-2972)
COMMENTARY. Even in case where the validity has been apprehended, there can be no certainty regarding it, because of the presence of the causes of misconception;
