________________
1322
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER xxv.
Question :-"How do you know that there is this difference of opinion ?" Answer:
TEXT (2945).
"[THAT THERE IS DIVERSITY OF OPINION IS SHOWN BY THE FACT THAT] ONE PARTY CONSISTING OF THE 'PRACHYAS' (EASTERNERS OR ANCIENTS) ASSERT DEFINITELY THAT" THE VALIDITY OF COGNITIONS IS ALWAYS INHERENT, SELF-SUFFICIENT, IN THEMSELVES" ; WHILE OTHERS ASSERT THAT IN SOME CASES, THE VALIDITY IS SELF-SUFFICIENT, WHILE IN OTHERS IT IS DUE TO EXTRANEOUS CAUSES; AND THERE IS NO HARD AND FAST BULE ONE WAY OR
THE OTHER.(2945)
COMMENTARY
One party i.e. the Mimāmsakas others '—the Buddhists.
These others hold that some cognitions are self-sufficient in their validity; e.g. (a) the direct perception of themselves by the cognitions by the Mystics, --(b) the cognition of the fruitful activity of things,-(c) Inferential Cogni. tion,-(d) Repeated Perception; this latter is definitely recognised as valid by itself as the possibility of misconception has been set aside by the repeated experience ;-while this is so in the case of some cognitions, in that of some others, the validity is derived from extraneous circumstances; e.g. the cognition in dispute, arising from the Veda -and also such Perception as has not had all possibility of mistake removed ; as repeated experience or the perception of effective action has not been obtained.
[Says the Opponent)" If that is so, then, according to you, there should be no diversity of opinion in regard to Inference; as its validity is self-sufficient. And yet there is such diversity of opinion; as some people hold that Inference is brought about by the three-featured Probans; some others hold that it is brought about by the two-featured Probans; while there are others who hold that it is brought by a Probans that is one-featuredFurther, under this view, the setting up of the definition of things would be futile.- Similarly, the validity of Inference shonld not be expounded and justified as against the Materialist; because here also, the validity is selfsufficient”.
Answer:- This does not affect our position; because when we assert the self-validity of Inference, what we mean is as follows:-As a matter of fact, Inference proceeds from the definite cognition of the Probans which is invariably concomitant (with the Probandum) through sameness or causation, -and then even without confirmation by subsequent fruitful action, it has been ascertained that it is indirectly produced by the Probans as invariably concomitant with the said Probandum and hence never non-concomitant
