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EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF 'SELF-SUYFICIENT VALIDITY'. 1311
TEXTS (2914-2915).
* THE FALSE CHARACTER OF THE THING IS NOT APPREHENDED BY THE FORMER (1.E. THE INVALID COGNITION) IN THE WAY IN WHICH THE TRUE CHARACTER (IS APPREHENDED BY THE VALID COGNITION). THUS THEN, IT IS ONLY WHEN THERE APPEARS THE COGNI. TION OF THE TRUTH BEING OTHERWISE, -OR THE COGNITION THAT THE SOURCE OF THE COGNITION HAS BEEN DEFECTIVE, THAT THE FALSITY (IX. VALIDITY) OF THE COGNITION BECOMES RECOGNISED ; NOT ON ANY OTHER GROUNDS. AT THE TIME. THAT IT APPEARS IT IS ALWAYS RECOGNISED AS VALID."
-(2914-2915)
COMMENTARY
* The former '--i.e. the invalid cognition. • Atta-apprehended. *True character';this is a corroborative instance per dissimilarity.
What is meant is as follows:-Falsity is not apprehended by the Invalid cognition in the same way in which truth is apprehended by the Valid cogni. tion; hence the two do not stand on the same footing. Because as soon as it is born, the Valid cognition is recognised as valid ; but the Invalid cognition is not similarly recognised as invalid, as soon as it is born : because it has always the semblance of the Valid cognition.
* Tadatrāpi, etc. etc. This sums up the view that the Invalidity of Cognitions is extraneous.
'Yadud dustakārane dhin' has to be construed here also.
It is only then that the falsity of the Cognition becomes apprehended', i.e. when there is the idea that the real state of things is otherwise,-and when there is the idea that the source of the Cognition has been defective.
The following might be urged–The falsity of the Cognition could be admitted only when it would be definitely known that these two ideas are actually true; and for the purpose of recognising the truth of these ideas, there would be need for another Cognition ; so that there would be an infinite regress.
The answer to this is given in the wordsAt the time that it appears, etc. etc., it stands for the said two ideas (1) of the real state of things being otherwise and (2) of the source of the Cognition being defective.Thus there would be no Infinite Regress.-(2914-2915)
The Buddhists and others have argued that the Words of the Veda must be false,-because they are words,-like such human assertions as Fire is cool.
The Mimämsaka proceeds to show that this argument is Inconclusive ',
