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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXIV.
TEXTS (2705-2706).
THE "Spheta' HAS BEEN ASSUMED BY THE GRAMMARIANS FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXPLAINING THE COGNITION OF THE MEANINGS OF WORDS.
-BUT THE LETTERS THEMSELVES BEING COMPETENT TO EXPRESS THE MEANING OF WORDS, THE ASSUMING OF THE SAID Sphota IS FUTILE. AS IT WOULD BE PERCEPTIBLE (IF IT EXISTED), BUT IS NOT PERCEIVED, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT IT DOES NOT EXIST.—IF IT IS IMPERCEPTIBLE, THEN IT CANNOT BE INDICATIVE, LIKE THE
INFERENTIAL INDICATIVE (WHICH IS EFFECTIVE ONLY WHEN PERCEIVED).
-(2705-2706)
COMMENTARY. [There is a lacuna in the text of the Commentary).
As it would be perceptible, etc. etc. Nothing apart from the Lettors. in the form of Word, eternal and indivisible,- is over perceived by auditory perception. On the contrary, what is clearly proved is the fact that no such * Sphoga' exists at all.
If the second view is accepted ....... [the reference is clearly to the lacuna)-the cause could be either positive or negative or both positive and negative,--these are the only alternatives possible. According to the first view (?).... the Cause could be either the property oi what is called 'Sphota', or that of something else. It cannot be the former, as the Sphota itself has been shown to be non-existent. Nor could it be the property of nome. thing else; because it could not subsist in the subject'; just like the arms and feet' in the proving of the non-eternality of the Jar (?).--Nor could the cause be the property of something negative; as that could prove only the contrary of what is desired.-Nor could it be both positive and negative : as that is always "inconclusive'.
Then again, is the Spliota' proved by a Ronson based upon the nature of the thing? Or by one based upon the Causal Relationship 1-The former view cannot be right; because as it is beyond the senses, its nature onnnot be known; if it were known, there would be no point in seeking for the proof of its existence: As its nature would be already known; and the whole attempt is to prove its existence and nature.-Nor is the second viow acceptable, because no causal relation can be known in relation to what is beyond the senses.
It might be argued as follows:-"In the case of the Auditory and other perceptions, when it is found that they appear only occasionally, it is concluded that they are dependent upon other causes also ; and from that, by implication, it is concluded that there is the Auditory organ; in the same manner, in the case in quostion, the comprehension of meaning being the 'subject', it is found that even when the Letters are the same,-as in the case of the words sara' and 'rasa'--the meanings comprehended are
