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EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF 'SELF-SUFFICIENT VALIDITY'. 1287
cannot be right. Because, the two being non-different (exc hypothesi), the one cannot be subsistent in the other.
The fact of the matter is that when the nature of the thing itself is found to be capable of a particular effective action,--and there arises the question as to its exact character,--the same nature of the thing is called
Capacity' (Potency); and it is not anything different. If the Capacity were something different from the Thing, the latter would cease to be an active agent; and there would be no possibility of any relationship between the two. This has been already discussed several times.-Thus then the capacity of the Cognition forms its very nature, and is subject to the same fate; and as such, before the appearance of the Cognition, it remains nonexistent, just like the nature of the Cognition itself,--and is then brought about. There is no incongruity in this view of the matter.
It is also quite right that the Capacity is produced along with the Cognition itself ; because the property that forms the nature of a thing must always share the same fate as that thing itself.
Or, the Capacity may be something different from the thing to which it belongs. Even so, as there can be no subsistence between the existent and the non-existent, the said subsistence cannot be admitted. Because the Capacity cannot subsist in the Cognition, in the manner that Being' does : because it is always completely established and does not depend upon any. thing else. Nor can there be any substratum for the existent thing; as such a substratum can serve no useful purpose; as for instance, in the case of the Vindhya and the Himalaya mountains.-It might be said that "what it brings about is continued existence".-But that cannot be right. Because the continued existence cannot be anything different from the existent thing. In fact, it is the nature of the existent thing itself that is spoken of as "continued existence, with a view to the denial of all other diversities. But the essence of the existent thing is not brought about by such a substratum ; hence it is futile.--If the continued existence and the existent thing be different from one another, then anything tending to bring about existence would be futile; as what it would bring about is only something else, in the shape of the continued existence; but the bringing about of one thing cannot produce any effect in another thing; so in either case there would be futility of what brings about the continued existence. It might be argued that-"it brings about an existence related to it".-That cannot be so; because there can be no relationship between continued existence' and the existent', as there is between the permanence and what brings about the permanence; and this would also lead to an infinite regress. This has been so often discussed.
Then again, if the continued existence that makes the thing lasting', be admitted to be something different from that thing, then, there can be no Destruction of anything at all; as the continued existence conducive to permanence would be always there.—Nor can it be asserted that-"Even though the continued existence is there, there would be destruction by causes leading to that Destruction". Because such cause also, being futile, could not bring about the Destruction. Because in this case also, the following
