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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXV.
Then again, like the Manifestation, the entity also that would be produced would have to be non-existent ; as there is no difference between the two (ex hypothesi). Or, like the nature of the entity, the Manifestation also that wonld be produced would be existent. Nor is this right; as nothing new is produced in this case; as there would be an infinite regress, as already explained.
Further, if it be held that the Cause operates upon what is already existent, then there would be no cessation of the producing of effects by Causes; as in that case, on securing what, would the Causes cease to operate 2-If it be urged that "they would cease on securing the existence of the effect "then that cannot be right; as, under your view, that existence would be already there. Hence that non-existent thing alone is produced of which there is a Cause,--and not such non-existent things as the 'sky-lotus': as there are no causes capable of producing these latter.
Thus it is that the causal relation is always restricted by the limitations of the efficiency of the Cause. Everything cannot be regarded as capable of producing everything else; as the efficiency of all things is restricted within limits through a beginningless chain of causes'.
If the idea is that—"because validity, if not existent, could not be produced by anything else, therefore it is said to be inherent", then, for the same reason, Invalidity also should be regarded as inherent. Hence the explanation is not worthy of notice.
Some people argue as follows:-" The validity of the Cognition consists in its capacity to bring about the apprehension of the Object; and this Capacity rosting in the Cognition, which is momentary, if not existent by itself, cannot be produced ; and no producing of it can be possible at any of the three points of time. For instance, it cannot be produced before the appearance of the Cognition, as it is in the Cognition that it subsists; and what is subsistent cannot be produced in the absence of the substratum ; e.g. the painting cannot be produced in the absence of the wall ;-as if it did, it would cease to be subsistent. It is for this same reason of the Capacity being subsistent in the Cognition, that both cannot be regarded as produced simultaneously; e.g. the wall and the painting, which are the substratum and the subsistent respectively, are not produced at one and the same time.Nor, on the other hand, can the Capacity be produced in the Cognition after the latter has been in existence; because the Cognition is momentary, and cannot continue to exist so long. It is on all these grounds that the validity of all Pramūnas is held to be inherent in them".
All this cannot be right. Because, as regards the assertion that,"The validity of cognitions consists in the Capacity productive of the apprehension of things", - this is entirely irrelevant; because the apprehension of things is synonymous with cognition'; and the Capacity subsisting in a Cognition cannot be productive of the same cognition; as in that case the capacity would not be subsistent in the Cognition; as the relation of cause and effect can be there only when both are there at one and the same time.
Then, it has been argued that being subsistent, the Capacity cannot be produced at the same time as, or before, the Cognition":--This also
