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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXV.
it is the polencies of things that como about, with specific charactors, from the nature of the things themselves; and herein lies their naturalnews' (or Inherent character). For instance, that same form and character) which belongs to the causes is infused by them in their effect; for example, when the Jar in produced out of the potsherds, the colour and other properties in the Jar are brought about by tho potshords through their own properties : and as for the capacity to contain water, that capacity is not present in the potsherds, and hence that is not brought about in the Jur in the said manner: this capacity in fact, appears in the Jar by itself ;-similarly, in the case of Cognitions, the capacity to differentiate und apprehend things, which is not present in the sense-organs and other causes of the Cognitions, is not brought about by these causes; it appears in the Cognitions by themselves. Thus it is that the Capacity is natural (inherent)".
This also is mere sanseless babbling. Because by the same process of reasoning, Invalidity also may be shown to be inheront. For instane, "invalidity' consists in the capacity to differentiate and approhond things otherwise than this real form'; and such capacity is not present in the Eye and other causes of Cognition.
Further, if it is true that the form that is not present in the Cause is not produced by them in the Effect, then how is it that the Sense-organ and other causes of Cognition produce, in the Cognition, the form that was not prowent there bofore ? Just as this form, though not present there, is produced there by the causes-30, in the same manner, why could not they produce in it the capacity for apprehending things also ? There can be nothing to provent their producing such capacity.
Then again, if Potencies or Capacities are held to be non-different from the thing to which they belong), then, like the form of the Thing-the capacities also must have their existence concomitant with (and due to) their causes; whence then could they be 'natural' or 'inherent' ?-If, on the other hand, the capacities are different from the thing.--then, as they would be existent by themselves, they would have no connection with their substratum (the Thing); as it would be rendering no help to them and what cannot render any help cannot be the substratum ; otherwise, there would be incongruities. Further, as they would have no causes, they would be appearing by themselves without being dependent upon the exigencies of time and place. For instance, a thing, having come into existence, disappears only when it is dependent upon something else ; that which is not so depen. dent, and operates by itself independently, why should it cease to operate at any time or place? If that were so, then the capacities of things would not be restricted ; anything could operate towards everything else.
Other people argue as follows:-"What has been said (by the Mimām. saka, in Text 2812) as to the validity of the Pramūnas being inherent in them, is on the basis of what is seen of their effects. Because it is only as positive existent entities that effects are produced by the Causes -as is clear from the fact that the producing of effects is always restricted. What are mere non-entities,--such as the sky-lotus-cannot be produced any. where ; nor is oil produced out of Sands. If the non-existent thing were pro
