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1282
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER xxv.
The Capacily'-in the Cognition, of apprehending and attaining (getting at) the cognised thing as it really exists.-(2837-2838)
The following Text points out that the Proposition (of the other party) involves contradiction of his own words:
TEXTS (2839-2840). FURTHER, INDISPUTABLE VALIDITY', CONSISTING IN CAPACITY, CAN BE ASCERTAINED THROUGH ANOTHER MEANS OF COGNITION,-AS HAS BEEN ASSERTED BY YOURSELF, IN THE DECLARATION THAT THE " CAPACITY OR POTENCY OF ALL THINGS IS PROVED BY PRESUMP. TION BASED UPON THE FACT THAT THEIR EFFECTS CANNOT BE OTHERWISE EXPLAINED",- (Shlokavārtika-Shünyavāda, 254]. Now IF IT IS PROVED BY PRESUMPTION, WHY CANNOT IT BE REGARDED AS PROVED BY SOMETHING EXTRANEOUS TO
ITSELF —(2839-2840)
COMMENTARY. * Why cannot it, etc.-It must be so regarded; that is, because the said Presumption is another Pramāna.-(2839-2840)
It has been argued (by the Mināmisaka) under Text 2814. that the validity itself would be destroyed, if it were held to be dependent on some. thing else",
The following Text points out that this argument is 'Inconclusive':
TEXT (2841). THE validity, BRING SOMETHING INDIVISIBLE, HAVING BIUN BROUGHT ABOUT BY ITS OWN CAUSES, THERE WOULD BE NO DESTRUCTION OF IT BY ITS dependence on something else; AS SUCH DEPENDENCE 18 NECESSARY ONLY FOR BRINGING ABOUT CERTAINTY (REGARDING THE VALIDITY).—(2841)
COMMENTARY. The sanno idou is furtlior clarified :
TEXT (2842). THE OTHER Pramūna IS NOT NEEDED FOR THE bringing about or THE VALIDITY ITSELF; IT IS NEEDED IN THE Pramāna ONLY FOR THE COGNITION OF certainly RIOARDING ITS EXACT
CHARACTER.-(2842)
COMMENTARY.
The following might be urged "li you are seeking to prove the fact of the validity of Cognition being extraneous' in relation to the Pramana