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1272
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXV.
TEXT (2813).
"[WHAT IS MEANT IS THAT) THE CAPACITY TO BRING ABOUT THE APPREHENSION OF THE COGNISABLE THING, ETC., BELONGS TO THE Promānas BY THEIR VERY NATURE; THE CAPACITY THAT IS NOT INHERENT IN A THING BY ITSELF CANNOT BE PRODUCED BY
ANYTHING ELSE."-(2813)
COMMENTARY.
If Cognition is what is Pramāna' in the sons of the form of Comition, then the capacity to bring about the approhension of the cognisable - i.e. the cognition of what is to be cognised,-must be inherent in it; BOCHUO Cognition is of the nature of the apprehension of things. If, howover, the Eye and the Organs are meant to be 'Pramūna, in the sonse of the means of Coyni. tion', then the capacity to bring about the right cognition of things must bo inherent in it; and the Vedic Injunction also inust havo the capacity inherent in it, of bringing about the cognition of things boyond the sonses. All this is included under the term 'adi', 'oto.' (in the compound meya. bodhidikē ').
The argument in support of this idea is added in the words (of the second line)— The capacity that is not, elc. etc.'.-(2813)
The same idea is further explained by the Mimümsaka :
TEXT (2814).
« INDEPENDENCE' (SELF-SUFFICIENCY) IS THE ONLY BASIS FOR VALIDITY'. Ir 'DEPENDENCE' WERE ADMITTED, THEN THE
VALIDITY ' ITSELF WOULD BE DESTROYED."-(2814)
COMMENTARY.
'Basis of validity'-i.e. of the very idea of 'validity'.
Tadēva '--Validity itself. Because on the cessation of the inore extensive character, the less extensive one cannot continue.-(2814)
The following might be urged Let the validity be destroyed; what is the harm?'
The Mimümsaka's answer to this is as follows:
