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CHAPTER XXV
Examination of the Doctrine of. Self-sufficient Validity'.
COMMENTARY.
With the following Text, the author proceeds to further support the idea of his doctrino being 'free from all self-sufficient Revelation' (declared in the Introductory Texts): -
TEXT (2811). THUS THEN, IT BEING ESTABLISHED THAT THE VEDAS ARE THE WORK OF A PERSONALITY, THE SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF THEIR AUTHORITY AND VALIDITY ALSO BECOMES OVERTHROWN WITHOUT
EFFORT.-(2811)
COMMENTARY With a view to establish the authority (and reliability) of the Revealed Word, the followers of Jaimini have declared that of all Pramūnas (Cognitions and Means of Cognition) the validity is self-sufficient, inherent,--and its only invalidity is due to other causes, extrinsic. They argue that if their validity were extrinsic (due to other causes), there would be an infinite regress; which would strike at the root of all notions of the valid and invalid cognitions.
On this question, there are four views possible :-(1) Sometimes both validity and invalidity are inherent ;(2) sometimes both are extrinsic ;(3) Validity is extrinsic and Invalidity is inhorent ;-(4) Validity is inherent and Invalidity is extrinsic.
(1) The first view is not tenable ; because would both Validity and Invalidity belong to the same individual cognition? Or to different ones (Validity to one and Invalidity to another)? It is not possible for two mutually contradictory and exclusive characters as Validity and Invalidity to belong to one and the same individual.-Nor can they belong to different individuals; as there is nothing to deterınine which would belong to whut; and hence there could be no certainty regarding it; which would mean that there would be no distinction between Valid and Invalid Cognitions which would not be confused. Because both being equally independent, there could be no certainty as to any particular Cognition being valid only. Because, As regards Annulment also, all difference between the two would become obliterated ; and there is no other means admitted that could definitely deterinine the one or the other. Thus any distinction as to one boing valid and the other invalid would be impossible.
(2) Nor can the second view be right; becauso the Cognition that had no character previously would have to be regarded as character.less. Further, Validity and Invalidity being mutually exclusive, if both of these were absent,
