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EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF 'SELF-SUFFICIENT VALIDITY'. 1271
-no other character could be recognised as belonging to it; and thus it would become truly inexplicable', 'indeterminate':--This has been thus declared (by Kumärila in Shlokavārtika-Chodana-Sätra 35 and 37)-Both (Validity and Invalidity) cannot be intrinsie, as the two are mutually contradictory; nor can both be extrinsic; as in this case, the Cognition would have to be regarded as featureless (35)... If it be argued that the two characters might not be incompatible, as belonging to different Cognitions,even so, as it is not dependent upon anything else, it cannot be determined which character belongs to which cognition.
(3) Nor can the third view be right; [that Validity is inherent and In. validity, is extrinsic];-as this involves an infinite regress. For instance, what is by itself intrinsically invalid, can never be expected to bring about validity ; because it is itself invalid; nor could it be expected to proceed from what is valid ; because it stands on the same footing as the other ;if it be expected that validity would come from outside, then there would be an infinite regress. For the purpose of determining the validity of a single Cognition, one would have to follow up a series of such Means, -and the entire life of man would become used up.
For these reasons, there being no other alternative available, the validity of all Pramānas (Cognitions and Means of Cognition) must be regarded as inherent in them, and the invalidity as extrinsic. --This argument may be formulated as follows:-When certain things are restricted to a certain thing,—they do not need anything else, so far as that thing is concerned, e.g. Akūsha and Incorporeality the Pramānas in question are restricted to the character of being valid ;-hence there is apprehension of something contrary to the wider character.-The Reason adduced here is not 'Incon. clusive '; a character which is impossible by itself cannot be thrust upon it by something else; e.g. corporeality cannot be thrust upon Akūsha.--This has been thus asserted— The Potency that is non-existent by itself can never be created by anything else.' (Shlokavārtika-Chodana-Sūtra 47).-(2811)
With the following Text, the Author proceeds to point out objections against the above view of the Mimāmsaka), by showing the insignificant character of his proposition :
TEXT (2812). You HAVE MADE THE ASSERTION THAT—"THE VALIDITY OF ALL Pramānas* SHOULD BE REGARDED AS INHERENT IN THEM”-[Shlokavārtika, Chodana-Sutra 47).-NOW WHAT IS THE MEANING THAT
YOU ATTACH TO THIS ASSERTION (2812)
COMMENTARY. To this question--what is the incaning that you attach to this assertion ? -the other party provides the following answer :
* The dual sense of the form . Pramāna 'as Cognition and Means of Cognition is brought out clearly in the Commentary on Text 2813. It has been thought best therefore to retain the original term 'Pramāna' throughout this chapter.
