________________
"THE REVEALED WORD."
1257
that is inadmissible; as the much wider conclusion to the contrary has been established in the form of the Perpetual Flux'.
If what is meant by the beginninglessness of the Word and Meaning is that there is no beginning of the series of causes and effects, then the Reason is 'Inconclusive', and also contradictory'; because the Relationship has no existence apart from the Relatives ; and consequently, that relationship also would be eternal like the Word and Meaning.
As regards 'Being devoid of the means, etc.' (Text 1978),--that also is * Inadmissible'; because it has been proved that even when there is difference by their nature, there are some things that are capable of bringing about the idea of sameness. Consequently, what is meant is that there is a means available in the shape of the idea of the sameness of the thing cog. nised by both Speaker and Hearer. And it has also been pointed out (Text 2773) that 'the Cognition cannot be obtained from the experienced men, and they also are equally ignorant'.
Otherwise, it would fall to the ground ';-If it be held that "the experienced persons, though themselves ignorant, comprehend the Relationship ”-then such a view would be clearly contrary to a fact of Senseperception; the Proposition being like the assertion of the blind man relating to Colours.-(2780)
It has been argued by the Mimāmsaka, under Text 2341, that--"As regards the argument based upon the fact of the Veda being an aggregate, the counter-argument should be stated as follows:-Vedic study is always preceded by previous study,--because it is called 'Vedic study', - like the study carried on at the present time".
The answer to that is as follows :
TEXT (2781).
AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE CAN BE NO COUNTER-ARGUMENT'AGAINST THE REASON BECAUSE IT IS AN AGGREGATE'; BECAUSE THIS IS A CHARACTER WHOSE INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE HAS BEEN RECOGNISED AS EMBRACING ALL THINGS.
-(2781)
COMMENTARY.
That is, the character of having its invariable concomitance with all things has been duly recognised.
This shows that the Buddhist argument proceeds on the nature and capacity of things; as nothing else can embrace all things. And when an Inference has proceeded on the strength of the nature and capacity of things, there can be no counter-argument against it. Because the nature of things cannot be altered ; nor is it possible for two mutually contradictory
