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1122
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XXIV.
as that is not a cause of this latter; hence the qualification-' not being a product as applied to the Probans, is useless.
The following might be urged—" By the qualification not being the work of man', what is meant is not the Positivo-Negative' Premiss, but a purely negative Premiss; the sense being that-being a Product, which is the contrary of the Probans (not being the work of man'), is concomitant with * falsity', which is the contrary of the Probandum ("Truthfulness),because falsity is found in the words of man only-hence wherever there is the character of not being a Product, which is contrary to that with which Falsity is invariably concomitant,--there, the character of not being a Product, which is negatively concomitant with falsity-being negatived, its concomitant, Falsity, also becomes negatived ; and thus it would follow that chat is not a Product asserts what is true; and as thus the desired conclusion would be got even without the affirmative premiss, any statement of such a Premiss would be useless".
True; this is so. If the concomitance between the two contraries is admitted. But it is not admitted. For instance, there would be concomitance between the two contraries of the Probandum, if against the Probans, which is contrary to the Probandum, there were a sublative cogni. tion. There is, however, no sitch sublative cognition. More non-perception does not prove non-existence; as it is not a conclusive proof for non-existence.
The following might be urged-“Being a Product is the contrary of not-being a Product; in the former we find falsity, whence it follows by implication that what is not a Product is devoid of falsity".
This is not right. From seeing something in one place, it does not follow that it does not exist elsewhere ; because one and the same thing is found to be concomitant with mutually contradictory things. For instance, the single character of non-eternality is found to be concomitant with what is produced by effort and also what is not so produced ; and the mere fact of non-eternality being found in what is produced by effort, cannot lead to the conclusion that it does not exist in what is not produced by effort.
Further, if the mere fact of falsity being sometimes found in what is a Product were to mean that the two are invariably concomitant, then it might be that truthfulness being found in words proceeding from men, truthfulness and proceeding from men may be regarded as invariable concomitants and consequently, on the cessation of the character of being a product, falsity should cease,-es also Truthfulness should cease: so that the more fact of not being the work of a Person does not prove truthfulnessEnough of this discussion.-(2406)
The Author has, so far, proved, in detail, the 'Inconclusiveness of the following Reasons (propounded by the Mimamsaka, in support of the Reliability of the Veda) a) that it is free from all defects conducive to falsity, as implied by the fact of its not being the work of man,-(b) that it is not the work of man, as indicated by the absence of defects,--(c) that it is not the work of man, which has been directly stated in so many words. He now proceeds to show the 'inadmissibility of these :