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« THE REVEALED WORD."
1155
Yogyatāyogi'—that which has connection with the capacity.--(24952499)
Says the Opponent-"If the Word-Sound were held to be a cause of the production of the Cognition, then there might be some room for raising the question as to its being capable or not capable ;-as it is, however, what is held to be the cause of the Cognition of the Word-Sound is the embellished Auditory Organ,-and not the Sound; hence there is no room for the objec. tions that have been urged ".
The Author attacks the view directly and refutes it in the following:
TEXT (2500).
IN THIS WAY THE WORD-SOUND WOULD BE UNCOGNISABLE ; AS IT WOULD NOT BE OF ANY USE IN ITS OWN COGNITION, AND, ON THAT ACCOUNT, IT WOULD NOT BE DIFFERENT FROM TASTE AND OTHER THINGS (SO FAR AS HAVING NO BEARING ON THE SAID COGNITION IS
CONCERNED).-(2500)
COMMENTARY.
In this way, like Taste, etc., the Word-Sound also would have no bearing upon its Cognition; and this would mean that it is not cognisable by that Cognition.
This argument may be formulated as follows:- When a certain thing has no bearing upon a Cognition, it cannot be cognised by that Cognition ; e.g. Taste, etc. in regard to Auditory Cognition ;-the Word-Sound has no bearing upon the Cognition of that Sound ;-hence there is apprehension of something contrary to the wider condition.
The reason here adduced is not Inconclusive'; because, if what has no bearing upon a Cognition were cognised by that Cognition,-there would be no restriction at all, and Taste might also become cognisable by Auditory Cognition.—(2500)
Says the Opponent :-" The cause of the Cognition itself would serve to restrict its scope, and there would be no such absurd contingencies as have been indicated. Because it is the cognition of the Word-Sound- and not that of Taste, etc.-which is actually found to come about from the causal factors appearing immediately after the embellishment of the Auditory Organ,because the efficiency of the causal factors is so restricted.-Even if the Word Sound were necessarily regarded as the cause (of its own cognition), some restriction on the efficiency of the cause will have to be admitted ; because, if the question is raised when all things are equally the cause of the Cognition, then, why is it that the cognition of sound that is produced is of the nature of the apprehension of sound only, not of the apprehension
