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1152
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXIV.
because being eternal and all-pervading, it must have only one form: there is nothing else that could have the "fast' and other forms, and appear in the Cognition ;-hence there being no real object of the said exact form, the Cognition is clearly objectle88.-(2489)
** The following might be urged—“The same Word-Sound, appearing in the 'fast' and other forms, would form the objective basis of the Cognition ; as has been declared that in every case the objective basis consists in the external thing varying with the variations of Time and Place."
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXTS (2490-2493).
THE ASSERTION THAT ONE COGNISES THE ONE THING AS OTHERWISE'
INVOLVES SELF-CONTRADICTION; IF WHAT IS COGNISED IS ANOTHER FORM, THEN HOW CAN THE same OBJECT BE SAID TO BE COGNISED ? UNDER THE VIEW THAT COGNITION IS FORMLESS, IT WOULD EXIST ONLY IN THE external FORM; CONSEQUENTLY, IF WHAT IS COGNISED IS external AND YET NOT OF THE NATURE OF THE EXTERNAL THING, -THEN HOW IS IT THAT IT EXISTS? EVEN UNDER THE VIEW THAT COGNITIONS HAVE FORMS, THE COGNITION ALWAYS APPEARS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXTERNAL FORM ; AND THEN ALONE IS THE OBJECT SAID TO BECOGNISED IN THE CASE IN QUESTION, HOWEVER, THE COGNITION DOES NOT APPEAR IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXTERNAL FORM.-HENCE IT FOLLOWS THAT ALL THIS COGNITION, WHICH IS WRONG, IS ENTIRELY objectless — 2490-2493)
COMMENTARY.
'Self-contradiction'- The same' and 'Otherwise' are mutually exclusive, the presence and absence of the one involving the absence and presence (respectively) of the other; and as such, these cannot co-exist in the same object.
Then again, under the view that forms do not belong to Cognitions, all Cognitions are false ; while under the view that forms belong to Cognitions, all Cognitions are objectless. This is what is shown by the words- Under the view, etc., etc. For those who regard the Cognitions as formless, what is perceived is the Blue form as subsisting in the Object. The Conch-shell does not really exist in the yellow form in which it figures in the wrong Cognition ; hence this is all the more clearly objectless.
Says the Opponent-"If the yellow form is not in the Object, then it must be in the Cognition ; otherwise, if it were in neither, how could there be cognition of it? Thus if it resides in the Cognition, it behoves you to explain how Cognition can be formless ? "