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1148
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XXIV.
It has been argued by the Mimāmsaka, under Text 2143, thut-"The Individual Letter 'Ga' has no existence apart from the substratum of the Universal 'Ga', etc. etc.".
This argument is open to the charge of being superfluous':-this is what is shown in the following:
TEXT (2479). The Universal 'GA' IS NOT HELD TO BE SOMETHING REAL, DISTINCT FROM THE LETTERGA; HENCE THE CHARGE OF FUTILITY IS IRRESISTIBLE, AS AGAINST THE Mimamsaka's
REASONING.—(2479)
COMMENTARY.
Isyatë ', 'is held '; this is to be construed with the na' following in the second line.-(2479)
TEXTS (2480-2481). IF IT BE URGED THAT WHAT IS SOUGHT TO BE PROVED BY THE Mināmsaka's ARGUMENT) IS THAT IT IS NOT THE SUBSTRATUM OF THE Universal 'GA', WHICH IS OF THE NATURE OF THE 'EXCLUSION OF OTHERS ', --THAT CANNOT BE RIGHT; AS THAT WILL INVOLVE THE FALLACY OF THE BASIS OF THE REA SON BEING INADMISSIBLE'.-INASMUCH AS THE LETTER 'GA' IS NOTHING APART FROM THE EXCLUSION OF THE Non-ga', TO WHICH OBJECT WOULD THE CHARACTER OF
BEING NOT APPREHENDED BY ANY COGNITION OTHER THAN THAT OF Ga' BELONGI
(2480-2481)
COMMENTARY.
The following might be urged-"What is meant to be proved by the reasoning in question is that the Individual is not the substratum of that universal 'Ga' which is of the nature of the 'exclusion of others'; hence there is no futility' in it; because you (Buddhist) do not hold that the Individual Ga is not the substratum of the exclusion of others"".
This is the view combated in this Text.
Even when what is sought to be proved is put in this way, the Reason becomes inadmissible'. Because the 'exclusion of others is not any. thing different from the thing thus 'excluded from others; in fact, it consists of the same Individual 'Ga', and it is spoken of as exclusion of others' or 'Apoha,' eto, when its precise nature is meant to be determined