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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XXIV.
cognitions in conformity with the real state of things consequently, the Corroborative Instance also should have exactly the same character ; other. wine the Instance would be devoid of the Probandum.
There is another argument, which is formulated as follows That Cognition which is brought about by an eternal sentence must be in conformity with the real state of things and hence right ;-just like the cognition of the verbal form of the sentence itself ;-the cognition of the fact of the performance of Agnihotra, etc. lending to Heaven is produced by the eternal sentence --hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.The eternality (of the Veda) has been proved in detail already ; hence the Probans in this argument cannot be said to be * Inadmissible'. . 'The Cognition brought about by the Vedic Injunction, etc. etc. This has been already explained.
There are two other arguments, formulated as follows:- The Cognition that is not produced by the assertion of an unreliable Person,--and also that which is free from contradiction (sublation, annulment) throughout the variations of time, place and personalities, must be reliable, liko the Cognition produced by the assertion of a reliable person of this same kind is the Cognition produced by the Vedic Injunctive Sentence ;-hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of the thing concerned.
The first of the Reasons adduced here cannot be regarded as "Inadmissible'; because it has been proved at great length that the Vede is not the work of a Person.
Nor can the second Renson be regarded as 'Inadmissible'; because, 88 has been explained in the following passage-*The idea brought about by the assertion-"Desiring Heaven, one should perform sacrifices "-is not an uncertain one; that is, it is not in the form that-Heaven may or may not follow from the performance of sacrifices; in fact, the idea is a definitely certain one that Heaven does follow; and when this is cognised for certain, it cannot be false. That Cognition alone is false which, having appeared, becomes sublated by the notion that such is not the actual case; the idea in question (that Heaven follows the performance of sacrifices) is never found to be so sublated at any time, or in regard to any person, or under any circumstances, or at any place. Hence it follows that it is not false or wrong -(Shabara-Bhāsya on 1. 1. 2, Translation, Page 5).
From all this it becomes established that the Veda is reliable, by itself, being as it is, the basis of all ideas of Dharma and allied matters ;-and like Light, it is a trustworthy source of knowledge for all mon. Hence, it bocomos established that all such theories as all that exists is mere Idea', which have been propounded by the Buddhists and othors, cannot be right.-(2346-2350)
Says the Opponent-II, like Light, the Veda is, by itself, a reliable source of knowledge for all men, then how is it that the Buddhist and others do not accept that view ? It cannot be right that for them, the Veda is not a reliable source of knowledge.
Anticipating this, the Mimämsaka supplies the following answer:
