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1066
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XXIV.
Says the Opponent-It is not possible for the same thing to have the two contradictory characters of being existent and being non-existent : similarly it cannot be right for the same thing to be both knoton and not known. If there is no incompatibility between these two, why should there be incompatibility between existence and non-existence ?
The Mimimaaka's answer to this is as follows:
TEXTS (2267-2269).
"IT IS OFTEN FOUND THAT THOUGH A CERTAIN THING exists, IT IS
not known ; BUT IT IS NEVER FOUND BY ANY PERSON THAT WHAT IS ABSOLUTELY non-existent is existent; BECAUSE existence and non. existence BEING MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY, CANNOT BELONG TO THE SAME THING. THERE IS NO SUCH CONTRADICTION BETWEEN being known and being not known ; BECAUSE knowledge SUBSISTS IN THE COGNISANT person; AND AS PERSONALITIES VARY, THERE IS NO INCOMPATIBILITY ; HENCE THE absence of knowledge, AS RESIDING IN ONE PERSON, DOES NOT BECOME EXCLUDED (BY THE presence of knowledge, IN ANOTHER PERSON).-- Shlokavārtika-Sambandhakpepaparināra, 33-35).—(2267–2269)
COMMENTARY.
It is incompatible for two mutually contradictory properties to reside in the same thing,-not when they reside in different things. As regards being known and being not known, these reside in different persons ; hence there can be no incongruity in this. The same cannot be said of existence and non-existence, which have been held (by the Opponent) to reside in the same thing (the Connection). Such, in brief, is the sense of the argument.-- (2267-2269)
Says the Opponent-In the case of the two characters of being known and being not-known, these two also imply the mutually contradictory characters of existence and non-existence as residing in the same substratum [it being the Object that has the characters of being known and being not. known, even though the knowledge resides in the mon; hence the said incongruity witiates this view also. Because the cognition and non-cognition of things are invariably concomitant with their excistence and non-existence : because they are based upon these; if it is not so, then it behoves you to explain why when two persons are standing upon equally suitable places, one sees the thing while the other does not.
In anticipation of this argument, the Mimämsaka says:
