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1040
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XXIV.
In this latter case, it is found that the Sprout is seen only when the seed has been there, and from this it is concluded that the Sprout is the effect of the Seed,-in the same manner, Sounds are perceived only when the articulations have been there ; why then, should Sound be not regarded as the offect produced by the articulations ? Specially because the snid fact is the solo basis for anything being regarded as the effect of something else.
The Mimimaaka's answer to this is ns follows:
TEXT (2208).
" ALL THAT THE FACT OF ONE THING APPEARING ONLY WHEN THE OTHER IS THERE INDICATES IS THE PRESENCE (IN THE LATTER) OF A CERTAIN POTENCY (OR CAPACITY), JUST LIKE THE POTENCY IN THE
AUDITORY ORGAN; AND THERE THE PRESUMPTION HAS BEEN ALLOWED TO REST.”[Shlokavīrtika
ETERNALITY OF WORDS-127-128].-(2208)
COMMENTARY.
There is hearing of Sound when the Auditory Organ is thore ; but this fact of the Sound being heard only when the Organ is there does not lead to the inference that the Auditory Organ possesses the potency to produce Sound; all that can be inferred is that it has the potency or capacity of apprehending it. Similarly, in the case in question, all that the fact of Sound being heard only when the articulations are there can justify is the inference that these articulations possess a certain potency : it cannot indicate the prorence in them of the capacity to produce Sound ; as the said fact is concomitant only with the presence of the capacity in general,--and not with any particular kind of Capacity. Honce in the proving of the particular kind of Capacity, the said fact, if citod as the Probans, cannot but be 'fallible', 'inconclusive '.---This is what is meant by the text.
Question How then is there the idea of the particular Capacity in the • Embellishment'?
Answer- There the Presumption has been allowed to rest.' -That is, Recognition having established the Eternality of the Word-Sound, the Presumption based upon the fact of the well-known phenomenon of Hearing not being otherwise explicable has been made by the author of the Bhäşya (Shabara)-to rest in the particular embellishment; and the capacity of this embellishment has not been inferred merely from the fact of concomitance (of the Embellishment and the Hearing).-(2208)
Against the view that there is embellishment of both (Sound and tho Auditory Organ)' (propounded as an alternative in the commentary on Text 2157), it has been argued (under Test 2168) that 'the objections urged against each of the two alternative views are all applicable to the view that there is embellishment of both'.
The Mimamsaka's answer to this is as follows: