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LOKÄYATA-MATERIALISM.
913
Cause of anything at all. This is what has been described in the words ' mere disagreeableness cannot render things objectionable '.
Further, it is found that after a pleasurable experience, when there is remembrance of it in a definite form, there proceeds, from this pleasurable Cognition, a feeling of love and attachment-How beautiful she is! So youthful and slim-waisted, with a handsome face !' and so forth; when one goes on contemplating upon it there appears in the mind of the man inclined to be passionate, the passion of Love. Similarly when some one causes one an injury, one goes on thinking of it-'He has done me this injury,-he has done it in the past-he is going to do it again and so forth; thereupon there appears Hatred.-How can all this be denied ;-specially by one who takes his stand upon Sense-perception (as the only Right means of Cognition)?
Similarly, when there is deterioration and improvement in the previous practice of Learning and Arts, it is found that there are corresponding deteri. oration and improvement in the subsequent cognitions. And it is found that, when the Mind is attracted elsewhere and the functioning of the Mind is defective, there is no perception of other things.
From all this it is clear that the idea that Cognition is the Cause of Cognition, is in accordance with reason and should not be objected to; also because it has been actually proved that Cognition is the Cause of Cognitions.—(1902-1905)
TEXT (1906).
THE REASON—BECAUSE THEY SUBSIST IN DIFFERENT BODIES CANNOT BE ADMISSIBLE. BECAUSE HOW CAN THERE BE ANY subsistence or THE COGNITION, WHICH IS INCORPOREAL AND HENCE NOT
LIABLE TO FALL DOWN, IN THE BODIES ?-(1906)
COMMENTARY.
Under Text 1861, it has been argued by the Materialist) that "there cannot be any relation of Cause and Effect between the two Cognitions under dispute, because they subsist in different bodies" ;this Reason there put forward is not admissible. Because, if the subsistence meant is that of the nature of container and contained ', then such subsistence in the Bodies is entirely impossible for Cognition, which is not liable to fall; because even though the causal relation may be there, the Cognition, which is incorporeal, could never be liable to fall; and for what is not liable to fall, no container is needed, as it could serve no useful purpose.-(1906)
Question "What then would the Container (or Receptacle) do in the case of Water and such things ?"
Answer :